2018 IEEE 37th International Performance Computing and Communications Conference (IPCCC) 2018
DOI: 10.1109/pccc.2018.8711276
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Towards Incentive Mechanism for Taxi Services Allocation with Privacy Guarantee

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Cited by 7 publications
(2 citation statements)
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“…Design. Li et al [21] consider taxi allocation and location privacy of passengers in online taxi-hailing systems. They first propose a Vickrey-Clarke-Groves (VCG)-based auction protocol to select the winner of passengers.…”
Section: Mechanismmentioning
confidence: 99%
See 1 more Smart Citation
“…Design. Li et al [21] consider taxi allocation and location privacy of passengers in online taxi-hailing systems. They first propose a Vickrey-Clarke-Groves (VCG)-based auction protocol to select the winner of passengers.…”
Section: Mechanismmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…They prove that the game has no pure Nash equilibrium, but has one mixed-strategy Nash equilibrium. Li et al [21] mechanism design how to protect passengers' location privacy and properly allocate passengers to taxies in online taxi services a VCG-based mechanism for passengers differential privacy…”
Section: Non-cooperative Gamementioning
confidence: 99%