Towards Paraconsistent Inquiry

Abstract

In this paper, we discuss Hintikka’s theory of interrogative approach to inquiry with a focus on bracketing. First, we dispute the use of bracketing in the interrogative model of inquiry arguing that bracketing provides an indispensable component of an inquiry. Then, we suggest a formal system based on strategy logic and logic of paradox to describe the epistemic aspects of an inquiry, and obtain a naturally paraconsistent system. We then apply our framework to some cases to illustrate its use.

Inquiry, Refutations and the Inconsistent

“…I already discussed the above points in an earlier work (Başkent, 2014). Now, my focus is the self-correcting character of inquiry which bears some similarities to Lakatosian methods that include informal proofs, thought experiments and quasi-emprical view of mathematical activity, bridging the two as we shall see.…”

“…(Hintikka, 1962, p. 3) In an earlier paper, I focused on the epistemological redundancy of bracketing in Hintikkan inquiry where I argued that the existence of inconsistencies is natural (and even desirable) in a dialogical inquiry. Yet, we can still make meaningful deductions under the presence of inconsistencies rendering the working system a paraconsistent one (Başkent, 2014). Other problems of the bracketing in Hintikkan inquiry include epistemic, game theoretical and heuristic problems where the heuristic issues are quite central also for Lakatos.…”

“…I claimed that inconsistencies are epistemically central for knowledge increase in dynamic epistemic procedures such as dialogues and dialectics (Başkent, 2014).…”

“…Moreover, it can also be argued that selecting the data just to maintain the consistency cannot be incorporated to interrogative inquiries (Başkent, 2014).…”

“…In short, "proof attempts" help us improve the proofs. However, if we bracket "proofs that do not prove", we risk the growth of (mathematical) knowledge, and lose the opportunity to learn from our mistakes (Başkent, 2014).…”