TPM Virtualization: Building a General Framework

Scarlata, Vincent; Rozas, Carlos; Wiseman, Monty; Grawrock, David; Vishik, Claire

doi:10.1007/978-3-8348-9452-6_4

Cited by 30 publications

(10 citation statements)

References 4 publications

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“…In this respect, current schemes for secure VM-vTPM migration protocols either increase the virtualized platform dependence on Privacy CA [4,7,8] or violate TPM usage restrictions [5]. Moreover, as far as we are aware, there is no implementation of a secure VM-vTPM migration protocol.…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 89%

Enabling secure VM-vTPM migration in private clouds

Danev

Masti

Karame

et al. 2011

Proceedings of the 27th Annual Computer Security Applications Conference

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The integration of Trusted Computing technologies into virtualized computing environments enables the hardware-based protection of private information and the detection of malicious software. Their use in virtual platforms, however, requires appropriate virtualization of their main component, the Trusted Platform Module (TPM) by means of virtual TPMs (vTPM). The challenge here is that the use of TPM virtualization should not impede classical platform processes such as virtual machine (VM) migration.In this work, we consider the problem of enabling secure migration of vTPM-based virtual machines in private clouds. We detail the requirements that a secure VM-vTPM migration solution should satisfy in private virtualized environments and propose a vTPM key structure suitable for VM-vTPM migration. We then leverage on this structure to construct a secure VM-vTPM migration protocol. We show that our protocol provides stronger security guarantees when compared to existing solutions for VM-vTPM migration. We evaluate the feasibility of our scheme via an implementation on the Xen hypervisor and we show that it can be directly integrated within existing hypervisors. Our Xenbased implementation can be downloaded as open-source software. Finally, we discuss how our scheme can be extended to support live-migration of vTPM-based VMs.

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Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 89%

Enabling secure VM-vTPM migration in private clouds

Danev

Masti

Karame

et al. 2011

Proceedings of the 27th Annual Computer Security Applications Conference

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“…Data measured for different application must be stored separately. We hence use the concept of virtual TPMs (vTPMs), which allows us to assign a (unique) virtual TPM instance to each outsourced process [28]. All vTPMs are managed by a vTPM manager, which provides an interface to create and access vTPM instances; the vTPM manager is notified whenever an application instance is started.…”

Section: Integrity Of Trusted Components and Runtime-secure Storagementioning

confidence: 99%

Dynamic Anomaly Detection for More Trustworthy Outsourced Computation

Alsouri

Sinschek

Sewe

et al. 2012

Lecture Notes in Computer Science

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Abstract.A hybrid cloud combines a trusted private cloud with a public cloud owned by an untrusted cloud provider. This is problematic: When a hybrid cloud shifts computation from its private to its public part, it must trust the public part to execute the computation as intended. We show how public-cloud providers can use dynamic anomaly detection to increase their clients' trust in outsourced computations. The client first defines the computation's reference behavior by running an automated dynamic analysis in the private cloud. The cloud provider then generates an application profile when executing the outsourced computation for its client, persisted in tamper-proof storage. When in doubt, the client checks the profile against the recorded reference behavior. False positives are identified by re-executing the dubious computation in the trusted private cloud, and are used to re-fine the description of the reference behavior. The approach is fully automated. Using 3,000 harmless and 118 malicious inputs to different Java applications, we show that our approach is effective. In particular, different characterizations of behavior can yield anything from low numbers of false positives to low numbers of false negatives, effectively trading trustworthiness for computation cost in the private cloud.

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“…Users of virtualization technology need some level of assurance about the expected behavior of a virtual machine (VM) and its ability to protect confidential information from unauthorized disclosure. The TPM specified by the Trusted Computing Group (TCG) offers security properties that can be leveraged by the users of virtualization technology to increase the protection of the system and data from cyber security threats [1]. However, the TPM was originally designed for use with a computing system in a one to one relationship.…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…In addition, issues pertaining to an Enterprise IT environment, such as migration, certification and logging have to be addressed as well. To this end, the design requirements presented in [1], [4], [7] and [8] were considered and we will like to suggest the following:…”

mentioning

confidence: 99%

Para-Virtualizing the Trusted Platform Module: An Enterprise Framework Based on Version 2.0 Specification

Yap

Tomlinson

2013

Trusted Systems

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Abstract. This paper introduces a framework for para-virtualizing the newer Trusted Platform Module (TPM) version 2.0. The framework covers the design of a para-virtualized TPM 2.0 and the considerations when deploying it for use in an Enterprise Information Technology (IT) infrastructure. To develop this framework, a quick study of the TPM 2.0 specification was undertaken and a survey of para-virtualizing TPM techniques was carried out. The study found that TPM 2.0 core functions are suitable for para-virtualization. A set of requirements was then developed to guide the design of this framework. The framework includes components to support the para-virtualized TPM. The framework also covers external components that are essential for the proper functioning of the para-virtualized TPM in an Enterprise IT environment. Research challenges for this framework are then discussed at the end of the paper.

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TPM Virtualization: Building a General Framework

Cited by 30 publications

References 4 publications

Enabling secure VM-vTPM migration in private clouds

Enabling secure VM-vTPM migration in private clouds

Dynamic Anomaly Detection for More Trustworthy Outsourced Computation

Para-Virtualizing the Trusted Platform Module: An Enterprise Framework Based on Version 2.0 Specification

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