Tracing the Distribution of Chinese and World Bank-Funded Projects and Public Demonstrations in Cameroon and Uganda

Abstract

<jats:p> Extant literature has explored the effects of foreign aid on armed conflicts and state repression, but not on public demonstrations. This article compares distribution patterns of Chinese and World Bank-funded projects and public demonstrations in Cameroon, receiving predominantly Chinese official finance, and Uganda, receiving predominantly traditional, Western aid. Distributive patterns suggest negative and positive associations between Chinese and traditional official finance on the one hand and public demonstrations on the other. However, with respect to anti-project demonstrations specifically, I find through fieldwork interviews in Cameroon that Chinese-funded projects are more prone to anti-project demonstrations owing to less stringent risk management standards. </jats:p>

Tensions in Sino-African labour relations: the view from the Karuma hydroelectric dam in Uganda

“…EXIM bank, in contrast, was not responsive to problems raised by the Cameroonian government or the official French oversight agency Coyne et Bellier and thus placed no pressure on Sinohydro to enforce standards. Che (2021) also found that worker protests at Memve'ele were consistently much more severe compared with Lom Pangar, including riots at the EXIM-funded dam. Che concludes that the World Bank's frequent site visits and the requirement that CWE set up a formal complaints office were crucial to managing workers’ concerns.…”

“…Research at multiple sites consistently shows that the Chinese state policy of non-intervention in partner country politics results in EXIM deferring to the host country's laws and practices for labour relations, environmental protections, and social impacts such as land compensation and disruptions of community livelihoods (Chen & Landry 2018; Yankson et al . 2018; Che 2021). 1…”

“…On the builder side, many Chinese firms also view social, environmental, and community responsibility standards as largely beyond their purview and the duty of the client government (Urban et al . 2015; Freeman 2017; Jensen-Cormier 2019; Chen & Landry 2018; Che 2021). This is especially true for firms focused only on dam construction and not design or operation; what are referred to as Engineering Procurement Construction (EPC) contracts 2 .…”

“…Research to date on the Karuma hydropower project has highlighted how this China-financed-and-built project has received less scrutiny compared with earlier Western-funded dams (Olanya 2016; Che 2021), the implications of EXIM's requirement that contractors must be Chinese firms (Wingo 2019; Ogwang & Vanclay 2021), and negative impacts on local villages (Mwalagho 2020). Labour issues at the dam, however, have received no analysis – a key gap in the literature that this article fills.…”

“…Che concludes that the World Bank's frequent site visits and the requirement that CWE set up a formal complaints office were crucial to managing workers’ concerns. This led to fewer, less serious anti-project demonstrations and a sense that Lom Pangar's Chinese managers were ‘more responsive to expressed grievances’ (Che 2021: 670). At the EXIM-funded Memve'ele dam, however, there was no formal mechanism to lodge complaints.…”