Trade &amp; Cap: A customer-managed, market-based system for trading bandwidth allowances at a shared link

Londoño, Jorge Mario; Bestavros, Azer; Laoutaris, Nikolaos

doi:10.1016/j.comnet.2011.05.019

Cited by 3 publications

(8 citation statements)

References 32 publications

Supporting

Mentioning

Contrasting

Order By: Relevance

“…jobs whose allocation per time-slot need not be fixed. In a related paper [9], we have explored this case as well as the problem of combining fixed-size and elastic traffic. APPENDIX PROOF OF THEOREM 1 Proof: Define the following function:…”

Section: Discussionmentioning

confidence: 99%

A Trading System for Fairly Scheduling Fixed-Sized Delay Tolerant Jobs at a Shared Link

Londoño

Bestavros

Laoutaris

2010

2010 IEEE Global Telecommunications Conference GLOBECOM 2010

Self Cite

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

Abstract-Scheduling of delay-tolerant jobs has been proposed as a mechanism to alleviate pressure on congested network resources. However, when multiple competing users share these resources, they may not be willing to reveal the flexibility of the schedule for their jobs. This work presents a trading system that enables the users to trade their finite allowances in a scenario where they have fixed-size atomic jobs. The trading system makes it possible for tasks with strict timing requirements to be completed on time, while rewarding customers who exhibit flexibility regarding the schedule of their workloads (by reducing their operating costs or assigning them a larger share of off-peak capacity). The trading system hereby presented thus provides the right incentives so that user agents schedule their delay-tolerant jobs in a way benefitial for the whole system. It is proven to always converge, and simulations on real traces show significant reductions on the peak-to-valley ratio on the link utilization.

show abstract

Section: Discussionmentioning

confidence: 99%

A Trading System for Fairly Scheduling Fixed-Sized Delay Tolerant Jobs at a Shared Link

Londoño

Bestavros

Laoutaris

2010

2010 IEEE Global Telecommunications Conference GLOBECOM 2010

Self Cite

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

show abstract

“…is a Nash equilibrium if and only if there exists G ∈ [0, D p ] satisfying the fixed-point equation (21) such that x = x (resp) (G). To conclude the proof, we show that (21) admits a unique fixed-point (see illustration on Fig.…”

Section: Appendix a Properties Of The Cost Of Shiftingmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…(G (resp) (G)) is also a non-increasing function of G taking values in [0, D p ]. Therefore, there is a unique fixed-point of (21).…”

Section: Appendix a Properties Of The Cost Of Shiftingmentioning

confidence: 99%

See 1 more Smart Citation

Incentive Mechanisms for Internet Congestion Management: Fixed-Budget Rebate Versus Time-of-Day Pricing

Loiseau

Schwartz

Musacchio

et al. 2014

IEEE/ACM Trans. Networking

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

Mobile data traffic has been steadily rising in the past years. This has generated a significant interest in the deployment of incentive mechanisms to reduce peak-time congestion. Typically, the design of these mechanisms requires information about user demand and sensitivity to prices. Such information is naturally imperfect. In this paper, we propose a fixed-budget rebate mechanism that gives each user a reward proportional to his percentage contribution to the aggregate reduction in peak time demand. For comparison, we also study a time-ofday pricing mechanism that gives each user a fixed reward per unit reduction of his peak-time demand. To evaluate the two mechanisms, we introduce a game-theoretic model that captures the public good nature of decongestion. For each mechanism, we demonstrate that the socially optimal level of decongestion is achievable for a specific choice of the mechanism's parameter. We then investigate how imperfect information about user demand affects the mechanisms' effectiveness. From our results, the fixedbudget rebate pricing is more robust when the users' sensitivity to congestion is "sufficiently" convex. This feature of the fixedbudget rebate mechanism is attractive for many situations of interest and is driven by its closed-loop property, i.e., the unit reward decreases as the peak-time demand decreases. Index Terms-congestion pricing; lottery-based incentive mechanisms; public good provisioning; probabilistic pricingPatrick Loiseau is with EURECOM,

show abstract

“…In [14], Paschalidis and Tsitsiklis, propose an optimal congestionbased pricing scheme in the context of phone networks and show that it can be approximated by time-of-day pricing. An alternative to congestion pricing based on a trading scheme has been recently proposed [15].…”

Section: B Related Workmentioning

confidence: 99%

Incentive schemes for Internet congestion management: Raffles versus time-of-day pricing

Loiseau¹,

Schwartz²,

Musacchio³

et al. 2011

2011 49th Annual Allerton Conference on Communication, Control, and Computing (Allerton)

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

Abstract-The Internet is plagued with congestion problems of growing severity which are worst at peak periods. In this paper, we compare two schemes that incentivize users to shift part of their usage from the peak-time to the off-peak time. The traditional time-of-day pricing scheme gives a fixed reward per unit of shifted usage. Conversely, the raffle-based scheme provides a random reward distributed in proportion of each user's fraction of the total shifted usage. Using a game-theoretic model, we show that both schemes can achieve an optimal level of decongestion at a unique Nash equilibrium. We provide a comparison of the schemes' sensitivity to uncertainty of the users' utilities.

show abstract

Trade & Cap: A customer-managed, market-based system for trading bandwidth allowances at a shared link

Cited by 3 publications

References 32 publications

A Trading System for Fairly Scheduling Fixed-Sized Delay Tolerant Jobs at a Shared Link

A Trading System for Fairly Scheduling Fixed-Sized Delay Tolerant Jobs at a Shared Link

Incentive Mechanisms for Internet Congestion Management: Fixed-Budget Rebate Versus Time-of-Day Pricing

Incentive schemes for Internet congestion management: Raffles versus time-of-day pricing

Contact Info

Product

Resources

About