Trade compromises between the European community and the United States: An interest group-game theory

Johnson, Martin; Mahé, Louis‐Pascal; Roe, Terry L.

doi:10.1016/0161-8938(93)90016-j

Cited by 31 publications

(15 citation statements)

References 13 publications

Supporting

Mentioning

Contrasting

Order By: Relevance

“…In one of the previous studies, Johnson et al (1993) found that it was in the best interest of the US to liberalize while the EU follows the SQ using 1986 weights. Kennedy et al (1996) on the other hand, found that SQ option for both US and EU was the optimal choice using 1990 weights, and without compensatory payments, only modest reform is possible.…”

Section: Resultsmentioning

confidence: 98%

“…Price instruments are denoted by A p fn and A p cn , and shift instruments such as subsidies are denoted by A s fn and A s cn , for producers and consumers, respectively. Denoting the world price of the commodity by P wn , the following domestic price functions are defined for producer and consumer price's respectively (Johnson et al, 1993;Kennedy et al, 1996).…”

Section: Calculations Of Weightsmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…They examined the policies concerned with international trade, grain procurement, public grain distribution, and production inputs. By the same token, in a multi-country study, Johnson et al (1993) conducted an empirical analysis using the PPF. They measured the role of special interest groups in the US and the EU.…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

See 2 more Smart Citations

Weight Perception and Efficiency Loss in Bilateral Trading: The Case of US and EU Agricultural Policies

Atıcı

2005

J Prod Anal

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

This study determines the perceived weights of various producer groups by policy makers in selected sectors (wheat, corn, sugar, beef and veal, and milk), for both the US and the EU, from 1980 to 2000, in five-year intervals. Results show that the US’s weights deviate less than the EU’s, compared with the external protections, indicating that the lobbying efforts of interest groups in the US are reflected more closely in external policy design, and are therefore more efficient than those in the EU. Game simulation suggests that it is in the best interest of both blocs to choose the status quo action among various trade liberalization scenarios with the latest calculated weights. Copyright Springer Science+Business Media, Inc. 2005weight efficiency, lobbying, political preferences, bilateral agricultural trade,

show abstract

Section: Resultsmentioning

confidence: 98%

Section: Calculations Of Weightsmentioning

confidence: 99%

See 1 more Smart Citation

Weight Perception and Efficiency Loss in Bilateral Trading: The Case of US and EU Agricultural Policies

Atıcı

2005

J Prod Anal

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

show abstract

“…The initial model was developed by Mah6, Tav~ra and Trochet (1988). Subsequently a political economic submodel was added (Johnson, 1990;Johnson, Mah6 and Roe, 1993) and other modifications ~vere made (Kennedy, 1994).…”

Section: Theoretical Frameworkmentioning

confidence: 99%

Strategic agricultural trade policy interdependence and the exchange rate: A game theoretic analysis

Kennedy

Witzke²,

Roe

1996

Public Choice

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

Strategic Agricultural Trade Policy Interdependence is modeled using a game theoretic framework. The model distinguishes between the European Community, the United States and a politically passive rest-of-the-world. Particular emphasis is placed on the effect of the exchange rate on the equilibrium outcome of this game. Without compensatory payments to those with the highest political influence, the results suggest that only modest reform is possible. With compensation, liberalization occurs but free trade is not obtained. Simulations also indicate that the U.S. gains incentive to reduce protection given a depreciation of the dollar, while incentive to liberalize trade policies decreases as the dollar appreciates.

show abstract

“…Johnson, Mahe¨and Roe 1993;Abbott and Kallio 1996). For instance, Abbott and Kallio used a stylised model of world wheat trade to illustrate, under di¡ering institutional arrangements (game structures), the levels of export subsidies (or taxes ö the strategies), net exports and the political payo¡s for four regions or players: the United States, the EU, the CAIRNS Group Countries and importers.…”

mentioning

confidence: 99%

The application of trade and growth theories to agriculture: a survey

Berkum¹,

Meijl²

2000

Aus J Agri & Res Econ

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

This article reviews a broad range of theoretical concepts available to explain international trade in agricultural and food products. For many years agricultural trade analyses were largely based on traditional perceptions of comparative advantage following neoclassical theory. Observations of agricultural trade suggest, however, that concepts from modern trade and growth theories are increasingly relevant. This survey demonstrates that many opportunities exist for applying these new theories to the modern food economy.

show abstract

Trade compromises between the European community and the United States: An interest group-game theory

Cited by 31 publications

References 13 publications

Weight Perception and Efficiency Loss in Bilateral Trading: The Case of US and EU Agricultural Policies

Weight Perception and Efficiency Loss in Bilateral Trading: The Case of US and EU Agricultural Policies

Strategic agricultural trade policy interdependence and the exchange rate: A game theoretic analysis

The application of trade and growth theories to agriculture: a survey

Contact Info

Product

Resources

About