Trade effects of geographical indication policy: The EU case

Raimondi, Valentina; Falco, Chiara; Curzi, Daniele; Olper, Alessandro

doi:10.1111/1477-9552.12349

Cited by 55 publications

(70 citation statements)

References 64 publications

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“…They are measured in the year negotiations for the agreement were concluded. The dummy GIsystem is 1 for partners that had their own GI system in place and therefore may be more likely to accept protecting EU GIs (Raimondi et al, 2020). To control for bargaining power, GDPEUPartner gives the ratio of EU GDP to partner GDP, using Worldbank data.…”

Section: Control Variablesmentioning

confidence: 99%

Exporting protection: EU trade agreements, geographical indications, and gastronationalism

Huysmans

2020

Review of International Political Economy

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One of the main objectives of EU trade policy is to establish wider protection for its regional specialty foods, known as Geographical Indications (GIs). In spite of US opposition, the EU has successfully considered additional protection for its GIs a red line in recent trade agreements. A key piece to the puzzle of this success is that whereas the literature has typically treated trade and non-trade issues as a dichotomy, GI protection encompasses both trade and non-trade aspects. In the EU, trade agreements are negotiated by the Commission but require member state approval. Both Greece and Italy have threatened not to ratify CETA over insufficient GI protection, so GIs clearly matter. This article develops and tests a theory of GI protection using new data on GIs listed for protection in 11 recent EU trade agreements. It finds that EU trade agreements are more likely to protect GIs with higher sales values and from countries in the South of Europe, where GIs are highly salient because of gastronationalism. These findings illustrate how economic, cultural and political factors shape and enable EU policy exports through trade agreements.

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Section: Control Variablesmentioning

confidence: 99%

Exporting protection: EU trade agreements, geographical indications, and gastronationalism

Huysmans

2020

Review of International Political Economy

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“…Their gravity model approach using UN Comtrade data for 1996 and 2010 demonstrated that the EU GI system had a significant trade effect on both intra-and extra-EU bilateral trade. A recent study of the European Strength2Food H2020 research project highlighted that GIs affect trade flows differently depending on whether GIs are produced in the exporter or the importer country (Raimondi, Falco, Curzi, & Olper, 2018). Using bilateral trade datasets for the period of 1996-2014, the auhors found that for extra-EU trade, having GI products in the exporting European country increases export, both in terms of volume and (unit) value.…”

Section: Literature Reviewmentioning

confidence: 99%

Determinants of regional trade agreements: Global evidence based on gravity models

Jámbor¹,

Gal²,

Török³

2020

Journal of International Studies

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There has been a continuous increase in the number of regional trade agreements (RTAs) worldwide during the previous decades. However, the analysis of determinants of regional trade agreements is somehow neglected in empirical literature. This paper aims to analyse the determinants of regional trade agreements by using gravity variables on a global sample. The results suggest that colonial variables are ambiguously related to RTAs, thereby making it hard to exactly define the role of colonial relations in the formulation of RTAs. Language is found to be negatively related to RTAs, meaning that countries speaking different languages tend to create more trade. The relationship between distance and RTAs is found to be relatively straightforward with higher distance and countries without common borders suggesting less regional trade relations. Finally, geographical indication does not seem to play a major role in creating regional trade agreements. As a practical result, it was found that gravity models are applicable for analysing the determinants of RTAs. Our results might be of interest to researchers and policymakers interested in the creation of RTAs.

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“…With income growth and globalization, consumers are interested in local foods, while farm groups see it as a potential way of marketing and protecting their products. At the policy front, this has resulted in regulations on geographical indications (GI)-an issue that has created tensions in trade negotiations (Josling 2006;Huysmans and Swinnen 2019;Raimondi et al 2020).…”

Section: Political Coalitions In Agricultural and Food Policiesmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…Second, globalization has increased the links between consumers and producers globally, but at the same time stimulated farmers to lobby for their "local products," seeking a coalition with consumers interested in local foods. At the policy front this has resulted in regulations on geographical indications (GI)-an issue that has created significant tensions in trade negotiations as the number of GIs has grown rapidly over the past 20 years, initially especially in the EU but now growing worldwide, and are an increasingly important item in trade negotiations (Josling 2006;Huysmans and Swinnen 2019;Raimondi et al 2020). An interesting related issue is how organizations representing environmental interests will reinforce the "local products" coalition by pointing at the environmental costs of trade and global sourcing.…”

Section: Gmos Gis and Food Definitionsmentioning

confidence: 99%

The Political Economy of Agricultural and Food Policies

Swinnen

2018

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Food and agriculture have been subject to heavy-handed government interventions throughout much of history and across the globe, both in developing and developed countries.1 Political considerations are crucial to understand these policies since almost all agricultural and food policies have redistributive effects and are therefore subject to lobbying and pressure from interest groups and used by decision-makers to influence society for both economic and political reasons. Some policies, such as import tariffs or export taxes, have clear distributional objectives and reduce total welfare by introducing distortions in the economy. Other policies, such as food standards, land reforms, or public investments in agricultural research, may increase total welfare but at the same time also have distributional effects. These distributional effects will influence the preferences of different interest groups and thus trigger political action.The inherent interlinkage between efficiency and equity issues in policymaking meant that for much of history, economics and politics were closely related disciplines, often written about by the same authors, as reflected in the works of the original architects of the economics discipline-Adam Smith, John Stuart Mill, David Ricardo, and so on. In the late 19th century the economics discipline started separating itself from the "political economy" framework. The revival (or return) of political economy started in the 1950s and 1960s and was referred to as "neoclassical political economy" or "new political economy," as economists started using their economic tools to analyze how incentives of political agents and constraints of political institutions influenced political decision-making. The start of this field is often associated with 1 This chapter is a revised version of J. Swinnen, "The Political Economy of Agricultural and Food Policies," chapter 21 in Handbook of Agricultural Economics, edited by G. Cramer, K. P. Paudel, and A. Schmitz, 381-398 (Oxon, UK: Routledge Publications, 2018). The material is reproduced with permission of the Licensor through PLSclear. For a more extensive discussion on all the issues discussed in this chapter and data illustrations, see also Swinnen (2018).

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Trade effects of geographical indication policy: The EU case

Cited by 55 publications

References 64 publications

Exporting protection: EU trade agreements, geographical indications, and gastronationalism

Exporting protection: EU trade agreements, geographical indications, and gastronationalism

Determinants of regional trade agreements: Global evidence based on gravity models

The Political Economy of Agricultural and Food Policies

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