Trade Misinvoicing: The Dark Side of World Trade

Buehn, Andreas; Eichler, Stefan

doi:10.1111/j.1467-9701.2011.01375.x

Cited by 45 publications

(74 citation statements)

References 26 publications

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“…Biswas and Marjit (2005) build a framework where exporters and importers misreport the value of their transactions due to tariffs and black market premium under controlled exchange rate regimes. Buehn and Eichler (2011) empirically support this finding using an international panel of national aggregate mirror statistics. Ferrantino, Liu, and Wang (2012) find that the Chinese exporters under-invoice their exports in order to avoid value-added tax.…”

Section: Introductionsupporting

confidence: 77%

Import surveillance and over-invoicing imports: the case of Turkey

Aktaş

Aldan

Ozmen

2014

Journal of Economic Policy Reform

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Turkey has been implementing import surveillance measures. A possible impact of that is the over-invoicing of imports to avoid surveillance procedures, as goods whose prices are under a predefined reference undergo surveillance. We extend mirror statistics methodology with panel data techniques using highly disaggregated data in order to test for such an impact. Our findings show that import figures of Turkey are inflated by about 2 billion USD in 2011, due to over-reporting induced by surveillance. This might also be the source of systematically positive net errors and omissions item in the balance of payments during the sample period.

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Section: Introductionsupporting

confidence: 77%

Import surveillance and over-invoicing imports: the case of Turkey

Aktaş

Aldan

Ozmen

2014

Journal of Economic Policy Reform

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“…The sum of the two gives the total capital that flows illegally in and out of Zimbabwe. This study follows existing literature (Boyce and Ndikumana, ; Beja, ; Buehn and Eichler, ; Patnaik et al ., ; Kar and LeBlanc, ) in estimating trade misinvoicing.…”

Section: Trade Misinvoicing and Capital Flightmentioning

confidence: 73%

Capital Flight and Trade Misinvoicing in Zimbabwe

Kwaramba¹,

Mahonye²,

Mandishara³

2016

African Development Review

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This paper estimates trade misinvoicing in Zimbabwe from major trading partners using the Morgenstern (1963) methodology. It uses trade data from 1980 to 2014 from the United Nations Commodity Trade Statistics Database. The results show that unrecorded capital outflows occur through trade with different countries including Italy, United States, Germany, and China, while unrecorded capital inflows into Zimbabwe are mainly from South Africa, Belgium, and Australia. Trade misinvoicing occurs mostly in exports of diamonds, gold, and nickel. Misinvoicing through imports is not rampant and occurs mostly through Germany, South Africa, and Zambia. The results show that capital flight increased during the period of macroeconomic and political instability. This indicates the need to ensure political and macroeconomic stability to reduce capital flight.

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“…Besides, like many regimes in the world that strive to maintain stable domestic food prices, China could use trade restrictions to insulate 7 One can think of smuggling (or illegal imports) as an omitted variable in the import demand equation for rice. For instance, many studies on smuggling (Buehn & Eichler, 2011;Martin & Panagariya, 1984;Pitt, 1981;Thursby, Jensen, & Thursby, 1991) noted that the illegal imports are possibly positively correlated with legal imports that are likely used to cloak or camouflage the illegal imports. Meanwhile, these studies also argued that illegal imports are positively correlated with the disparity between domestic price and import price, and thus are negatively correlated with import prices when holding domestic prices unchanged (this is likely the case in China's rice market as discussed in the Results section).…”

Section: Discussionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Tariff quota administration in China's grain markets: An empirical assessment

Chen

Villoria

Xia

2020

Agricultural Economics

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In 2016, the U.S. launched a trade dispute against China at the World Trade Organization, arguing that China has been restricting its grain imports via tariff quota administration. Despite sharp criticisms by the U.S., the extent to which the grain imports were restricted in China remains largely unknown, primarily due to that China's grain import behaviors are still under‐researched. The U.S. grain export sector might actually gain little from China's grain trade liberalization in the short run, since China has become less import dependent on the U.S. through the pursuit of import diversification. In this context, this article aims to quantify impacts of the tariff quota administration on China's grain imports from its trading partners. We calculate ad valorem tariff equivalents of the tariff quota administration and then estimate import demand elasticities using a source differentiated import demand model. We find that the tariff quota administration might have reduced China's quota fill rates for the grain commodities by 10–35% during 2013–2017. In particular, the U.S. wheat exports to China were largely negatively affected. We also find that the tariff quota administration in China acts like a variable import levy—its import restrictiveness varies negatively with world prices, leading to lower import demand elasticities.

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Trade Misinvoicing: The Dark Side of World Trade

Cited by 45 publications

References 26 publications

Import surveillance and over-invoicing imports: the case of Turkey

Import surveillance and over-invoicing imports: the case of Turkey

Capital Flight and Trade Misinvoicing in Zimbabwe

Tariff quota administration in China's grain markets: An empirical assessment

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