Trade remedy provisions in regional trade agreements

Abstract

Standard-Nutzungsbedingungen:Die Dokumente auf EconStor dürfen zu eigenen wissenschaftlichen Zwecken und zum Privatgebrauch gespeichert und kopiert werden.Sie dürfen die Dokumente nicht für öffentliche oder kommerzielle Zwecke vervielfältigen, öffentlich ausstellen, öffentlich zugänglich machen, vertreiben oder anderweitig nutzen.Sofern die Verfasser die Dokumente unter Open-Content-Lizenzen (insbesondere CC-Lizenzen) zur Verfügung gestellt haben sollten, gelten abweichend von diesen Nutzungsbedingungen die in der dort genannten Lizenz gewährten Nutzungsrechte. Terms of use: Documents in Manuscript date September 2007Disclaimer: This is a working paper, and hence it represents research in progress. This paper represents the opinions of the authors, and is the product of professional research. It is not meant to represent the position or opinions of the WTO or its Members, nor the official position of any staff members. 1 Abstract This paper maps and examines the provisions on anti-dumping, countervailing duties and safeguards in seventy-four regional trade agreements (RTAs). The RTAs vary in size, degree of integration, geographic region and the level of economic development of their members. The key policy concern of the paper is that the elastic and selective nature of trade remedies may lead to more discrimination, with reduced trade remedy actions against RTA partners, but a greater frequency of trade remedy actions against non-members. The adoption of RTAspecific trade remedy rules increases this risk of discrimination, with trade remedies against RTA members being abolished outright or being subjected to greater discipline. The templates used for mapping the trade remedy provisions reflect this central concern.The results of the mappings suggest the need to be vigilant about increased discrimination arising from trade remedy rules in RTAs. A number of RTAs have succeeded in abolishing trade remedies. Probit and multinomial logit model estimations suggest that these RTAs are characterized by a higher share of intra-RTA trade and deeper forms of integration that go well beyond the dismantling of border measures. A fairly large number of RTAs have adopted RTA-specific rules that tighten discipline on the application of trade remedies on RTA members. In the case of anti-dumping for example, some provisions increase de minimis volume and dumping margin requirements and shorten the duration for applying anti-dumping duties relative to the WTO Anti-dumping Agreement. In similar fashion, many of the provisions on bilateral safeguards lead to tightened discipline or reduce the incentives to take safeguard actions. Safeguard measures can be imposed only during the transition period, have shorter duration periods and require compensation if put in place. Further, retaliation is allowed if there is no agreement on compensation. RTA provisions on global safeguards require that, under certain conditions, RTA partners be exempted from multilateral safeguard actions. This conflicts with multilateral rules which require t...

Free Trade Agreements and Governance of the Global Trading System

“…The disputes between the EU and the US on hormone-fed beef and on GMOs that have been taken to the WTO Dispute Settlement Body were outcomes of this difference in approach.19 For an extensive analysis of trade remedy measures in regional and bilateral agreements, seeTeh et al (2007).…”

The Evolution of the Treatment of Agriculture in Preferential Trade Agreements

“…The geographic spread of members of PTAs has also continued to evolve as countries seek to form agreements with new partners. Over time, there has been a shift towards the greater involvement of Asian countries; in addition, there has been a move away from the traditional concept of "regional integration" among neighbouring countriesa key element of previous PTAsin favour of cross-regional PTAs (Dür and Elsig, 2015;Teh, Prusa and Budetta, 2009). 4 Furthermore, looking ahead, the majority of agreements under negotiation are also bilateral (Fiorentino, Verdeja and Toqueboeuf, 2007;Dür and Elsig, 2015;WTO, 2018d).…”

“…Developing countries are also increasingly making use of PTAs to govern trade among themselves. This trend is partly due to the emergence of several major PTA "hubs" in the developing world (Fiorentino et al, 2007;Teh et al, 2009).…”

“…exact provisions of the WTO Agreement on Safeguards, while several others make direct reference to the procedure and obligations contained in WTO rules (Kruger, Denner andCronje, 2009, in Viljoen, 2016). Lastly, in some cases, agreementssuch as those aimed at deeper integration, the European Union being one examplewere found to limit or prohibit the application of safeguard measures between members of the agreement (Lissel, 2015, in Viljoen, 2016Teh, Prusa and Budetta, 2009).…”

“…In addition, a number of studies have focused on coding specific provision areas across a smaller number of agreements. These areas include goods market access (Estevadeordal, Shearer and Suominen, 2009); trade remedies (Viljoen [2016], Crawford, McKeagg and Tolstova [2013] and Kruger, Denner and Cronje [2009] on safeguards and Teh, Prusa and Budetta [2009] on trade remedies more generally); TBTs (Piermartini and Budetta, 2009); intellectual property (Valdés and McCann, 2014;Elsig and Surbeck, 2016); and competition (Solano and Sennekamp, 2006). More recent studies include OECD analysis (World Bank, publication forthcoming) of SPS provisions across 283 agreements notified to the WTO and in force, as part of a broader World Bank study on regional trade agreements.…”