Trade, turnover, and tithing

Magee, Christopher; Davidson, Carl; Matusz, Steven J.

doi:10.1016/j.jinteco.2004.04.002

Cited by 26 publications

(17 citation statements)

References 31 publications

Supporting

Mentioning

Contrasting

Order By: Relevance

“…What does the empirical evidence tell us about sectoral preferences with regard to trade liberalization in industries with high labour market frictional costs? Recent work by Magee, Davidson, and Matusz (2005, 167) suggests that ‘there is no significant difference between capital and labour groups (either in exporting [or in] import‐competing industries) in their support for representatives voting in favour of trade liberalization,’ which is consistent with our prediction of sector irrelevance 15…”

supporting

confidence: 88%

Trade theorems with search unemployment

Sheng

2010

Canadian J of Economics

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

We revisit the Heckscher-Ohlin-Samuelson model in the presence of labour market frictionsà la Mortensen-Pissarides. Relaxing the assumption of the one-workerone-firm matching rule, we show that the Stolper-Samuelson theorem and the Rybczynski theorem may not hold in specific circumstances. We also demonstrate that the Factor Price Equalization theorem is valid only for capital and unemployed labour across countries, but not for employed labour. In equilibrium, trade patterns are determined by countries' factor endowments and relative factor intensities in sectors (independent of factor intensities in production). Finally, our results suggest an additional explanation for the 'missing trade' phenomenon. JEL classification: F16, J64Théorèmes de commerce international et chômage frictionnel. On ré-examine le modèle de Heckscher-Ohlin-Samuelson quand il y a des frictionsà la Mortensen-Pissarides sur le marché du travail. En relaxant la règle d'appariement un-travailleur-une-entreprise, on montre que le théorème de Stolper-Samuelson et celui de Rybczybski peuvent ne paŝ etre valides dans certaines circonstances spécifiques. On montre aussi que le théorème d'égalisation du prix des facteurs est valide seulement pour le capital et le travail non employé entre pays, mais non pour le travail employé. Enéquilibre, les patterns de commerce sont déterminés par la dotation en facteurs de production des pays et les intensités relatives d'utilisation des facteurs de production entre secteurs (sans rapport avec les intensités de facteurs dans la production). Finalement, les résultats suggèrent une explication additionnelle du phénomène du 'commerce manquant.'

show abstract

supporting

confidence: 88%

Trade theorems with search unemployment

Sheng

2010

Canadian J of Economics

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

show abstract

“…The instruments for trade policies we propose are the number of years that a country has remained outside of the GATT/WTO since its inception 17 Please see the online appendix. Next, we provide purely economic arguments as to why the two instruments we use are good instruments.…”

Section: More Controls and Instrumental Variable Estimatesmentioning

confidence: 99%

International Trade and Unemployment: Theory and Cross-National Evidence

2008

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

We present a model of trade and search-induced unemployment, where trade results from Heckscher-Ohlin (H-O) and/or Ricardian comparative advantage. Using cross-country data on trade policy, unemployment, and various controls, and controlling for endogeneity and measurement-error problems, we find fairly strong and robust evidence for the Ricardian prediction that unemployment and trade openness are negatively related. This effect dominates the positive H-O effect of trade openness on unemployment for capital-abundant countries, which turns negative for labor-abundant countries. Using panel data, we find an unemployment-increasing short-run impact of trade liberalization, followed by an unemployment-reducing effect leading to the new steady state.

show abstract

“…In column (4) of the table, I break the TURNOVER variable into its job creation and job destruction components, to find that it is job destruction that motivates trade protection. This is an intuitive, reduced‐form result, which may differ from the structural implications of Magee, Carl, and Matusz (2005), where TURNOVER affects trade protection through its influence on lobbying activity. More importantly, the new estimates show that turnover affects the level of sectoral trade protection independently of trade‐induced unemployment and trade adjustment costs, which are still significant 29…”

Section: Sensitivity Experimentsmentioning

confidence: 85%

“…Another labor market variable that may influence the level of sectoral trade protection is labor turnover. Following Magee, Carl, and Matusz (2005), I use data from Davis, Haltiwanger, and Schuh (1996) to construct TURNOVER. Estimation results from column (3) of Table 5 suggest that higher turnover rates translate into higher levels of sectoral trade protection.…”

Section: Sensitivity Experimentsmentioning

confidence: 99%

Trade Adjustment, Political Pressure, and Trade Protection Patterns

Yotov¹

2012

Economic Inquiry

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

This paper introduces trade adjustment considerations as active determinants of trade policy. Using novel U.S. data sets, I show that, despite their small monetary value, trade‐induced unemployment and trade‐adjustment costs can incite an incumbent politician to grant protection to an unorganized industry, even in the presence of political pressure by organized sectors. This finding complements the theoretical predictions from Grossman and Helpman (American Economic Review, 84, 1994, 833–50) who argue that the government should protect organized industries but should subsidize imports in unorganized sectors. (JEL D73, F13, F14, F16, J68)

show abstract

Trade, turnover, and tithing

Cited by 26 publications

References 31 publications

Trade theorems with search unemployment

Trade theorems with search unemployment

International Trade and Unemployment: Theory and Cross-National Evidence

Trade Adjustment, Political Pressure, and Trade Protection Patterns

Contact Info

Product

Resources

About