2014
DOI: 10.1017/s1365100514000443
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Trade Unions, Unemployment, Economic Growth, and Income Inequality

Abstract: In this paper, unemployment, growth, and income inequality are interdependent and endogenously determined in a unified model of a trade union. Analytically, we show that the effective labor force exhibits an intensive margin response, in the sense that in response to higher unionization the number of employed workers decreases, but each individual employed worker provides more working hours. This intensive margin response leads to the possibility of the coexistence of high unemployment and high growth. Moreove… Show more

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Cited by 22 publications
(14 citation statements)
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“…12 A more general specification would be to assume a right-to-manage framework or that the union and employers bargain over both wages and employment through a generalized Nash bargaining solution, as for instance in Chang and Hung (2016). However, given our focus on gender issue we adopt a simpler specification for simplicity.…”
Section: Wages and The Labor Marketmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…12 A more general specification would be to assume a right-to-manage framework or that the union and employers bargain over both wages and employment through a generalized Nash bargaining solution, as for instance in Chang and Hung (2016). However, given our focus on gender issue we adopt a simpler specification for simplicity.…”
Section: Wages and The Labor Marketmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…In this case, we assume that through a generalized Nash bargaining problem, both the union and the employers' federation negotiate simultaneously over wages and employment, taking into consideration the demand of final goods firms' for intermediate goods. 9 Formally, in line with Chang and Hung (2016) and Chang et al (2007), the optimization problem can be written as…”
Section: Final Goods Sector-firms Trade Unions and Bargaining Strucmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…Structural rigidities can be referred to government legislation on minimum wages, mandated firing costs, unemployment benefits, collective bargaining, and Shapiro-Stiglitz style efficiency wages. A large number of studies focusing on one or two of these rigidities have been made in recent years, which include Varga et al (2014), Bhattacharyya and Gupta (2015) and Chang and Hung (2016) on the collective bargaining front, and Bucci et al (2003), Meckl (2004), Parello (2011), and Zagler (2011) on the efficiency wage front. 1 A key result from the literature is that the relationship between growth and unemployment may be weak, both on impact and in the long run.…”
Section: Introductionmentioning
confidence: 99%