“…When confronted with Footbridge‐like and Trolley‐like dilemmas, individuals with high psychopathy traits report they would perform the action of sacrificing one person to a greater extent than individuals with low psychopathy traits (Bartels & Pizarro, ; Glenn, Koleva, & Iyer, ; Koenigs, Kruepke, Zeier, & Newman, ; Tassy, Deruelle, Mancini, Leistedt, & Wicker, ), a result that is consistent with the assumption that the aversive emotional response to harmful acts is weak or even absent in these participants. Moral judgements, instead, do not seem to be affected by psychopathy levels, as participants with high trait psychopathy do not judge sacrificing one person as more morally acceptable than participants with low trait psychopathy (Cima, Tonnaer, & Hauser, ; Glenn, Raine, Schug, Young, & Hauser, ; Tassy, Deruelle, et al ., ; but see Patil, ). Such results could be explained by hypothesizing that with no emotional response informing on the rightness of action, individuals with psychopathy would produce altered choice of action, but normal moral judgement through preserved perspective‐taking processes (Glenn et al ., ; Tassy, Deruelle, et al ., ).…”