Traitor tracing for prerecorded and recordable media

Jin, Hongxia; Lotspiech, Jeffrey; Nusser, Stefan

doi:10.1145/1029146.1029160

Cited by 35 publications

(33 citation statements)

References 12 publications

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Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…AACS adopts the use of the scheme in [20] as the assignment step to satisfy some practical restrictions for the assignment step. But the detection step shown in [20] is not efficient and practical enough. The algorithm we will show in this paper takes into considerations of those realities shown above that have largely been overlooked in existing work.…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…Furthermore, the entire tracing can be done in very reasonable time. As a result, AACS adopts the use of the scheme in [20] as the assignment step and adopts the work presented in this paper as the coalition detection step.…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

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Efficient Coalition Detection in Traitor Tracing

Jin

Lotspiech

Megiddo

Proceedings of the Ifip Tc 11 23rd International Information Security Conference

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In this paper we study the traitor tracing problem for re-broadcasting attack. In this attack, instead of building a pirate clone device (or program) based on their secret keys and sell the clone, the attackers want to stay anonymous by redistributing the decrypted content or the actual encrypting keys for the content. To defend against this type of re-broadcasting attack, the content and its actual encrypting key must come with different versions. In our setting, content is divided into multiple segments, each segment comes with multiple variations and each variation is differently encrypted. Each user/device can only play back one variation per segment through the content. A typical traitor tracing scheme for re-broadcasting attack involves two basic steps, assigning the key/variation to devices (assignment step) and detecting at least a traitor in the coalition when a series of pirated key/content are recovered (coalition detection step). We take into considerations of some realities that have been overlooked in existing schemes. As a result, we have designed a probabilistic coalition detection algorithm that is not only closer to real world scenarios but also more efficient than existing approaches. The traceability is defined in terms of the number of recovered pirate copies of the content needed to detect traitor(s) as a function of the number of traitors involved in a coalition. While existing schemes try to identify traitors one by one, our probabilistic algorithm can identify multiple traitors simultaneously and deduce the coalition size during tracing. Therefore, for the same number of total traitors in a coalition, our scheme allows the detection of all the traitors using less number of recovered copies. The superior efficiency of the our coalition detection algorithm made its adoption by AACS (Advanced Access

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Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

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Efficient Coalition Detection in Traitor Tracing

Jin

Lotspiech

Megiddo

Proceedings of the Ifip Tc 11 23rd International Information Security Conference

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“…Because some users (called traitors) may give out their decryption keys to construct pirate decoders, and some users (also called traitors) may directly spread the decrypted contents over the Internet (known as anonymous attack [15] or pirate rebroadcast [17]), the ability of traitor tracing is needed for broadcast encryption system. Traitor tracing scheme is used to discourage legitimate subscribers from giving away their secret keys and decrypted contents.…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Traitor Tracing against Public Collaboration

Zhao

Zhang

2011

Information Security Practice and Experience

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Abstract. Broadcast encryption provides a convenient method to distribute digital content to subscribers over an insecure broadcast channel. Traitor tracing is needed because some users may give out their decryption keys to construct pirate decoders. There are many traitor tracing schemes based on collusion secure codes and identifiable parent property codes. However, these schemes are subject to public collaboration of traitors, which is presented by Billet and Phan in EUROCRYPT 2009 as an attack against code-based traitor tracing schemes. In this paper, we describe a generic collusion secure codes based scheme secure against such collaboration. Our scheme is motivated by the idea of identity-based encryption with wildcards (WIBE). We regard the collusion secure codeword for each user as his/her identity, and issue private key accordingly. When in broadcasting, we use a special pattern of WIBE, namely all bit positions in the codewords of intended receivers are set as wildcards. When in tracing, we use another special pattern of WIBE, namely all positions are set as wildcards except the tracing position. By using WIBE, each user is issued one decryption key which should be used as a whole and any incomplete part of the key is useless, while in previous codes based schemes each user holds a number of keys that can be used separately for different bit positions in the codeword. Thus our scheme is resistant to public collaboration, since if the decryption key is disclosed as a whole, it will immediately lead to the accusation of the very traitor. Our idea fits well for code based traitor tracing schemes, no matter collusion secure codes or identifiable parent property codes. We provide an instance based on Boneh-Boyen-Goh WIBE scheme, achieving constant private key storage cost for each user. We also present another instance achieving shorter ciphertexts, on the expense of increasing public keys and private keys. Our scheme presents an answer to the problem left open by Billet and Phan.

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“…Furthermore, we concatenate codes [1]. In our construction, variations in each segment are assigned following an inner code, which are then encoded using an outer code.…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Flexible Traitor Tracing for Anonymous Attacks

Jin

Lotspiech

2005

Communications and Multimedia Security

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Abstract. Copyrighted materials are divided into multiple segments and each segment has multiple variations that are differently watermarked and encrypted. The combination of watermark and encryption enables one to identify the actual users (traitors) who have engaged in the piracy. In this paper, we shall present a traitor tracing scheme that can efficiently and flexibly defend against anonymous attacks.

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Traitor tracing for prerecorded and recordable media

Cited by 35 publications

References 12 publications

Efficient Coalition Detection in Traitor Tracing

Efficient Coalition Detection in Traitor Tracing

Traitor Tracing against Public Collaboration

Flexible Traitor Tracing for Anonymous Attacks

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