Trajectory of risky decision making for potential gains and losses from ages 5 to 85

Weller, Joshua A.; Levin, Irwin P.; Denburg, Natalie L.

doi:10.1002/bdm.690

Cited by 155 publications

(198 citation statements)

References 76 publications

Supporting

Mentioning

169

Contrasting

Unclassified

Order By: Relevance

“…Instead their decisions were influenced by the relative difference between two probabilities (PR) and not by the fact that one of the probabilities was 1.0 and therefore completely safe (figure 2). By contrast, human adults have a strong preference for options that offer a safe reward compared with any other option, provided the maximum outcome is the same [13,14]. In a sense, the chimpanzees tested here seemed to be strictly guided by (intuitive) mathematics-'How much do the two likelihoods differ?…”

Section: Discussionmentioning

confidence: 82%

When maths trumps logic: probabilistic judgements in chimpanzees

Hanuš

Call

2014

Biol. Lett.

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

When searching for hidden food, do chimpanzees take into account both the number of hidden items and the number of potential hiding locations? We presented chimpanzees with two trays, each of them containing a different food/cup ratio and therefore a different likelihood of finding a baited cup among empty alternatives. Subjects' performance was directly influenced by the relative difference ( probability ratio (PR)) between the two given probabilities. Interestingly, however, they did not appreciate the special value of a truly safe option (with P ¼ 1.0). Instead, they seemed to 'blindly' rely on the PR between the two options, systematically preferring the more likely one once a certain threshold had been reached. A control condition ruled out the possibility of low-level learning explanations for the observed performance.

show abstract

Section: Discussionmentioning

confidence: 82%

When maths trumps logic: probabilistic judgements in chimpanzees

Hanuš

Call

2014

Biol. Lett.

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

show abstract

“…Results show that younger and older adults' willingness to take a risk did not differ in the loss trials. Yet, older adults were less willing to take a risk in the gain trials [Weller et al, 2010]. Older adults, then, may be less willing to accept a potential loss (not winning) when they can prevent it.…”

mentioning

confidence: 99%

“…In a study on risky decision making employing the cups task [Levin & Hart, 2003], Weller, Levin and Denburg [2010] showed that age-related differences in risky decision making occurred depending on whether the expected outcome constituted a gain or a loss. In the cups task, there are distinct trials in which the participants can either achieve small monetary gains or avoid small monetary losses.…”

mentioning

confidence: 99%

Normal Aging and Decision Making: The Role of Motivation

Depping

Freund²

2011

Human Development

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

The main argument of this review is that motivational development associated with normal aging affects decision making. With increasing age, the ratio of gains to losses becomes more and more unfavorable. Reflecting the increasing losses in resources, goal orientation changes from a predominant orientation towards gains in young adulthood to an increasingly stronger orientation towards the prevention of loss in older adulthood. As goals serve as reference points for the evaluation of decision outcomes, this change in goal orientation across adulthood might also affect decision making. The decision-making literature has recognized that choices are influenced by goal orientation. However, little research has been conducted on how goals influence the decision-making process in general and with regard to aging in particular. To date, findings on decision making and aging remain inconsistent and are in need of a developmental framework. With regard to applications, a better understanding of the aging decision maker can provide insight into how to improve communication efforts about issues like advance care planning, medical treatment, and housing options.

show abstract

“…While under PT it is modeled as an inflection of the value curve around the reference point, more behavioral approaches to LA have advocated that it should be defined by reference to expected value, allowing for the contribution of probabilities (e.g., Brooks & Zank, 2005). Reported differences between the developmental profile of risk taking for gains and for losses (decreasing for gains, relatively constant for losses) have been credited to the impact of LA (Weller, Levin, & Denburg, 2011). However, conditions for measuring LA are as stringent as those for measuring scope insensitivity, requiring that gains and losses be measured on a scale with a known zero (Viegas, Oliveira, Garriga-Trillo, & Grieco, 2012).…”

Section: Palabras Clavementioning

confidence: 99%

Comparación de adultos y adolescentes con respecto al alcance de insensibilidad de las curvas de valor: Un método de medición de funcionamiento

Viegas

Oliveira

2016

Univ Psychol

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

The curvature of the value/utility function has been understood, since D. Bernouilli, as the expression of an attitude towards risk. This perspective was kept in such influential theories of judgment and decision as Prospect Theory, in both its original and cumulative versions (Kahneman & Tversky, 1979;Tversky & Kahneman, 1992). More recently, dualprocess interpretations of the value function as a mix of affect and deliberation (Hsee & Rottenstreich, 2004) have proposed that function curvature reflects the operation of affect-based evaluations via an affective focus coefficient indexed by "α" (varying between 0 and 1) in the equation v = A α S 1-α (with "v" the subjective value, "A" the intensity of the affective response, and "S" the scope of the stimuli). According to this view, evaluating more hedonic targets results in more curved (scopeinsensitive) functions than evaluating instrumental/utilitarian targets, and more affect-oriented subjects exhibit more pronounced curvatures (lower 1α) than deliberation-oriented subjects. These predictions are evaluated in this study and additionally used for an exploratory evaluation of Farley's (2006, 2007) proposal that analytical processing and gist/ affect-based processing predominate, respectively, in adolescents' and in adults' judgment and decision making. Information Integration Theory was used to establish a model allowing for the functional measurement of subjective value at the (ratio) level required for comparing curvature parameters and computing Loss Aversion coefficients. The outcomes partially favored the prediction of larger curvatures (lower 1-α) and larger loss aversion in more hedonic tasks. However, they did not support the prediction of more scope insensitivity and larger values of loss aversion in adults than in adolescents. As the main suggested difference between adults and adolescents, individual differences in risk attitude appeared to be less polarized towards loss aversion among adolescents in more hedonic tasks.

show abstract

Trajectory of risky decision making for potential gains and losses from ages 5 to 85

Cited by 155 publications

References 76 publications

When maths trumps logic: probabilistic judgements in chimpanzees

When maths trumps logic: probabilistic judgements in chimpanzees

Normal Aging and Decision Making: The Role of Motivation

Comparación de adultos y adolescentes con respecto al alcance de insensibilidad de las curvas de valor: Un método de medición de funcionamiento

Contact Info

Product

Resources

About