Trance logic as incomplete responding.

Abstract

Two experiments tested predictions derived from the logical incongruity and differential demands hypotheses of trance logic responding. In Experiment 1, subjects that were highly susceptible to hypnosis showed higher levels of responding on three trance logic indexes (i.e., transparent hallucinating, duality, incongruous writing in age regression) than did subjects low in susceptibility to hypnosis who were instructed to fake hypnosis (i.e., simulators). In line with the differential demands hypothesis, hypnotic "reals" were less likely than simulators to report believing in the reality of the suggested situations and were less likely to report fine details in their hallucinations. Also consistent with the differential demands hypothesis (but inconsistent with the logical incongruity hypothesis), rate of trance logic responding correlated negatively with the degree to which hypnotic reals rated themselves as subjectively experiencing suggested effects, and as becoming absorbed in suggestions. Experiment 2 found that highly susceptible hypnotic and nonhypnotic subjects (collectively called "reals") responded equivalently on all suggestions. High-and low-susceptible simulators also performed equivalently on all suggestions. Consistent with the differential demands hypothesis (but not the logical incongruity hypothesis), (a) trance logic indexes differentiated reals from simulators when these indexes also measured incomplete subjective responding, and (b) trance logic indexes that failed to measure incomplete responding also failed to differentiate reals from simulators. The findings of both experiments are more consistent with social psychological views than with special processes views of hypnotic responding.In an influential early study, Orae (1959) compared the response to a visual hallucination suggestion in highly susceptible hypnotic subjects (i.e., "reals") and subjects low in susceptibility to hypnosis who had been instructed preexperimentally to fake deep hypnosis (i.e., simulators). During their experimental session, all subjects were administered the same hypnotic procedures, suggestions, and interviews. During their hypnotic session, all subjects sat facing a coexperimenter. While the subjects' eyes were closed, the coexperimenter rose from his chair and moved from the subjects' field of view. Subjects were then instructed to open their eyes and to "see" (i.e., hallucinate) the coexperimenter still sitting in the chair. After the subjects described their hallucinated image, the hypnotist pointed to the actual coexperimenter and asked the subjects what they saw. Ome (1959) reported that some of the hypnotic reals but none of the simulators spontaneously indicated that they could simultaneously see the coexperimenter and see through him (i.e., transparency response). Relatedly, when faced with the actual coexperimentei; hypnotic reals were much more likely than simulators to report seeing two images of the coexperimenter at the same time (i.e., double hallucination response). According

The ‘hidden observer’ and ideomotor responding: a real‐simulator comparison

“…These real-simulator differences are consistent with previous studies (e.g. Williamsen, Johnson and Erikson, 1965;Hilgard, 1977;Spanos, deGroot and Gwynn, 1987;Green et al, 1990) showing that simulators often overplay their role and overestimate the effects of hypnosis. The fact that the hidden observer reports generated by simulators and reals were statistically indistinguishable from one another suggests that the pattern of results can parsimoniously be explained by the cues embedded within the instructions without recourse to special hypnotic processes, a unique state of consciousness, or particular hypnotic ability.…”

Trance logic in hypnosis and imagination.

“…We also categorized subjects' comments on the separate dimensions of completeness of and belief in their experience of the suggested effects. Completeness reflected the degree to which subjects described their experience of age regression or hallucination as being total or whole (see Spanos et al, 1987). Belief reflected the degree to which the subjects ascribed reality status to their experience of age regression or hallucination (see Sutcliffe, 1960Sutcliffe, , 1961.…”

“…Experiment 2 Spanos et al (1987) suggested that the apparently illogical performance of some hypnotized subjects is based on the incompleteness of their experience of the suggested effect. In terms of the items we used in this study, for instance, the argument is as follows.…”

“…Moreover, in such a context the subjects can be preselected for their real or simulating roles on the basis of their imagery ability, in a manner analogous to the selection of subjects for the hypnosis context of Experiment I on the basis of their hypnotizability Whether real hypnotized subjects experience complete or incomplete age regression or hallucination in an imagination context is an empirical question. According to the argument of Spanos et al (1987), however, if they experience complete effects, then the incidence of trance logic will be very low. Iftbey experience incomplete effects, then the incidence of trance logic will be higher; these responses, however, would not be illogical ones.…”

On the inevitability of finding hypnosis‐simulator equivalence

“…As Green et al point out, the last of these effects, that simulators can overact, is well known (e.g. Spanos, deGroot and Gwynn, 1987). Spanos and his co-workers (e.g.…”