TRaNS special section on “Growing Religious Intolerance in Indonesia”

Abstract

Over the past two decades, Indonesian society has seen an increase in Islamic conservatism. Beginning with growing expressions of Islamic pietymore Muslim men praying five times a day and more women wearing the Islamic veil (hijab)this trend is increasingly being expressed in political terms. Such expressions can be seen in the passage of hundreds of new local regulations (perda) that mandate residents to follow certain Islamic principles, and in public protests such as the recent 'defending Islam' (Aksi 212) protests of 2016/17 which successfully demanded the prosecution of former Jakarta governor Basuki Tjahaja Purnama for allegedly committing an act of blasphemy. More troubling, however, is the fact that these expressions of growing conservatism are often followed by acts of religious intolerance against minoritiesfrom Muslim sects such as Ahmadi and Shi'a to Christians, Buddhists, and other religious minorities. The Setara Institute has documented a continuous rise in the number of incidents of religious freedom violations in Indonesia over the past few yearsfrom 134 in 2014 and 196 in 2015, to 208 in 2016 (Lesthari 2017). The high frequency of these attacks and the inability of governments-both at national and local level-to stop such attacks and bring the perpetrators to justice have left a negative reputation for Indonesia both domestically and internationally. As much of the more violent incidents of religious intolerance (e.g. Muslim-Christian conflicts in Maluku and Poso) occurred during the early years of Reformasi (1998-2001), scholars tended to focus their attention on how to explain 'large-scale communal violence' incidences rather than 'localized communal riots' that while smaller inscale, these attacks on churches and Ahmadi mosques became more prevalent and pronounced long after these conflicts have subdued. Works by Bertrand (2004), Sidel (2007), Van Klinken (2007), Duncan (2013) and Tajima (2014) have analysed these larger conflicts and come with their different conclusions on what causes them that have enriched the literature on ethnic conflict and political violence, not just in Indonesia but also generalized globally. However, none of these works have dealt with smaller, localized communal riots that are often started with exclusionary or intolerant actions against religious minorities. While there is recent research that demonstrate the historical and institutional roots of growing Islamization and how it affects tolerance toward religious minorities in Indonesia both nationally and locally (e.g. Ricklefs 2007 and 2012; Menchik 2016; Buehler 2016), these works lack the combination of insights that help to put together a puzzle on why religious intolerant actions have become prevalent in contemporary post-Reformasi Indonesia, namely, macro-sociological changes in Indonesian society that result in contemporary intolerant actions against religious minorities, and the micro-level changes in the political structure that provides opportunities for hard-line Islamic groups to initiate intolerant a...

Victimisation-by-ingroup Consciousness: Its Antecedents and Impact on Radicalism

“…Moreover, the government in predominantly Muslim countries has persecuted not only non-Muslims but, even more harshly, also Muslims who dissent with the state’s version of Islam (Uddin, 2014). In Indonesia, where this study has been conducted, such act of religious intolerance is typically initiated by radical Islamic groups, who have attacked the Muslims they consider heretical (Sebastian & Arifianto, 2020). Overall, these anecdotal records suggest that the potential actors of Muslims’ intragroup violence can be multiple, not only terrorists but also the government and a certain group of Muslims.…”

Breaching Boundaries in Muslim and Christian Tourism from Indonesia to Israel and Palestine

“…Hefner (2017: 95) argues that inner-religious frictions challenge inter-religious togetherness and the imagined community of fellow Indonesian citizens. Recent orthodoxy among Muslim Indonesians provokes intolerance against religious minorities, including other Muslim sects like the Ahmadiyah (see Sebastian and Arifianto 2020).…”

“…In fact, the Palestinian flag has become a symbol of the so-called 'Aksi Bela Islam' (Action to Defend Islam) demonstrations, today's most influential opposition to the incumbent government of President Jokowi. The movement began with protests against Ahok, the former governor of Jakarta, a non-Muslim and ethnic Chinese politician who was accused of blasphemy due to a reference he made to Surat al-Maidah, verse 51, of the Qur'an, in an election campaign speech in 2016 (Burhani 2018;IPAC 2018;Sebastian and Arifianto 2020). Ever since, an alliance of Muslim groups has taken to the streets, claiming that Islam needs to be defended in national and international contexts.…”

Indonesia’s Foreign and Maritime Policies Under Joko Widodo: Domestic and External Determinants

“…Towards the end of Yudhoyono's second term as president, allegations erupted over scandals and graft within the incumbent coalition parties (Alford, 2013) and among a few office-holders (Cochrane, 2013) under the administration. During his second term, there were also acts of religious intolerance against minorities targeted at Muslim sects like Ahmadis and Shi'as, while Christians, Buddhists and other minority groups were also targets for attack (Sebastian & Arifianto, 2020). Although Indonesia under Yudhoyono benefitted tremendously from a strong gross domestic product (GDP) growth averaging 6%, lackadaisical policy implementation in various sectors of the Indonesian economy meant that private interests like that of the mafias and other lobby groups entrenched themselves in important parts of the economy.…”