Transboundary water allocation in critical scarcity conditions: a stochastic bankruptcy approach

Janjua, Shahmir; Hassan, Ishtiaq

doi:10.2166/aqua.2020.014

Cited by 14 publications

(3 citation statements)

References 30 publications

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“…The mean annual river flows at 50% probability came out to be 168 km 3 . When the river flows are less than the allocated water based on canal diversions, as given in the accord, of 141.11 km 3 by about 17% of probability of exceedance, it creates disputes among the provinces (Janjua & Hassan, 2020b).…”

Section: Limitations Of the Interprovincial Water Accordmentioning

confidence: 99%

Water management in Pakistan's Indus Basin: challenges and opportunities

et al. 2021

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The Indus River System is a major source of life in Pakistan. A vast array of Pakistan's agricultural and domestic consumption needs are critically dependent on the Indus River System. The Indus River contributes towards 25% of the country's gross domestic product, providing water for almost 90% of the food production in Pakistan. Linked to the water security issues, Pakistan is potentially at risk of facing a severe food shortage in the near future. The World Bank report of 2020–2021 estimates that the water shortage will increase to 32% by 2025, which will result in a food shortage of almost 70 million tons. Water shortage could also result in confrontation between the provinces as river sharing has always been a source of problem for Pakistan. According to recent estimates, siltation and climate change will reduce the water storage capacity by 2025 to almost 30%. As for the per capita water storage capacity in Pakistan, it is about 150 m3, which is quite meagre in comparison with that in other countries. Irrigated agriculture will soon be adversely affected due to the reduced surface water supplies and the consequent increase in groundwater abstraction. To make matters worse, over the past decades, a great deal of distrust has developed among the provinces of Pakistan regarding the water distribution issue, and the successive federal governments have failed to formulate a cohesive inter-provincial National Water Policy. Along with the shortages and increasing demand for water, administrative corruption also plagues the water sector and is quite common. The beneficiaries of this water reallocation system are not only the rural elite, for example the large and politically influential landlords, but also the small and medium capitalist farmers. If not properly addressed, these complications of decreasing water resources could result in serious political and economic hostility among the provinces. If it wants to harness its potential to increase storage capacity, Pakistan must improve its water-use efficiency and manage its groundwater and surface water resources in a sustainable way. Strengthening the institutions and removing mistrust among the provinces are the key elements for maintaining a sustainable irrigated agriculture in the Indus Basin.

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Section: Limitations Of the Interprovincial Water Accordmentioning

confidence: 99%

Water management in Pakistan's Indus Basin: challenges and opportunities

et al. 2021

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“…Furthermore, bankruptcy rule with game theory is another study direction. Janjua and Hassan [20,21] built stochastic bankruptcy games in transboundary water resource allocation based on GDP contribution and water resource utility. These multi-objective optimization issues are all decision-making problems involving one player but not multiparty negotiation and bargaining issues in current water resource management.…”

Section: Literature Reviewmentioning

confidence: 99%

An Optimal Water Resource Allocation Mechanism Based on Ex-Post Verification and Reward in Huangbai River

Zhang

2021

Water

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Under the current administrative system (AS) in China, the water resources governor allocates limited water resources to several users to realize the utility of water resources, leading to a principal–agent problem. The governor (referred to as the principal and she) wishes to maximize water resource allocation efficiency, while each user (referred to as the agent and he) only wishes to maximize his own quota. In addition, the governor cannot know water demand information exactly since it is the water users’ private information. Hence, this paper builds an ex ante improved bankruptcy allocation rule and an ex post verification and reward mechanism to improve water allocation efficiency from the governor’s perspective. In this mechanism, the governor allocates water among users based on an improved bankruptcy rule before the water is used up, verifies users’ information by various approaches, and poses a negative reward to them if their information is found to be false after the water is used up. Then, this mechanism is applied to Huangbai River Basin. Research results show that the improved allocation rule could motivate users to report demand information more honestly, and ex post verification could motivate water users to further report their true information, which, as a result, could improve the water allocation efficiency. Furthermore, this mechanism could be applied to the allocation of other resources.

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“…As there is no defined mechanism in the Water Apportionment Accord for the sharing of water deficits, it therefore creates a dispute among the provinces (Condon et al, 2014;Janjua & Hassan, 2020a). Also, the two small provinces (population-wise) of KPK and Baluchistan are exempted by the water shortages by an act of 2003; this is deemed unfair by Punjab and Sindh as they have to share the water deficit during the shortage ( Janjua & Hassan, 2020b).…”

Section: Description Of the Study Areamentioning

confidence: 99%

Addressing the supply-demand gap in shared rivers using water diplomacy framework: utility of game theory in the Indus river within Pakistan

et al. 2020

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The question of how to govern and manage transboundary river basin for competing and often conflicting demands due to limited supplies continues to be an issue of concern, conflict, and cooperation. A key novelty of this paper is the use of the Water Diplomacy Framework (WDF) to address supply-demand mismatch using the notion of collaborative problem-solving and joint fact-finding. It builds on innovative applications of game-theoretic approaches and uses equity and sustainability as guiding principles to address the supply-demand mismatch. Five different bankruptcy methods (net benefit ranges between US$17,462M to US$18,201M) and the Nash Bargaining Solution (net benefit ranges between US$18,132M to US$19,216M) are used to resolve supply-demand mismatch in the Indus basin among four provinces within Pakistan. The maximum total benefit generated from the Nash Bargaining Solution is 5.5% higher compared to the best bankruptcy method. Moving from the non-cooperative and rule-based bankruptcy methods to the Nash Bargaining Solutions provided increased benefit for all stakeholders. Reallocation of these increased benefits among the four provinces is done by applying the Nash Bargaining Solutions for homogenous and heterogeneous weights. These findings suggest that aspects of WDF – cooperative problem-solving approaches involving joint fact-finding and exploring different options – has the potential to simultaneously resolve supply-demand mismatch and generate more benefits for all stakeholders.

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Transboundary water allocation in critical scarcity conditions: a stochastic bankruptcy approach

Cited by 14 publications

References 30 publications

Water management in Pakistan's Indus Basin: challenges and opportunities

Water management in Pakistan's Indus Basin: challenges and opportunities

An Optimal Water Resource Allocation Mechanism Based on Ex-Post Verification and Reward in Huangbai River

Addressing the supply-demand gap in shared rivers using water diplomacy framework: utility of game theory in the Indus river within Pakistan

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