Transcendental Ontology and Apperceptive Idealism

Gabriel, Markus

doi:10.1080/24740500.2018.1698096

Cited by 5 publications

(7 citation statements)

References 11 publications

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“… 11 It is for this reason, I think, that Pippin is open to Gabriel's objection that this reading ‘gives preference to subject over substance’ (Gabriel 2018: 384), in that Pippin's focus on the apperceptive character of thought fails to explain ‘that we often get reality right—that, therefore, skepticism is unwarranted on all fronts’ (Gabriel 2018: 385). I think, pace Gabriel, that Pippin is right to focus on the apperceptive character of thought—I agree that this is central to Hegel's project—but I think, as I will argue, that doing so makes a Deduction argument necessary if we are to block Gabriel's ‘subject over substance’ objection.…”

Section: Notesmentioning

confidence: 99%

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Is there a Deduction in Hegel's Science of Logic?

Cooper-Simpson¹

2021

Hegel Bulletin

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Robert Pippin's recent study of Hegel's Logic, Hegel's Realm of Shadows, argues that we should read Hegel as rejecting the need for a Transcendental Deduction in logic because he takes Hegel, in the Phenomenology of Spirit, to have ruled out the scepticism that motivates Kant's Deduction. By contrast, I argue, we cannot understand what Pippin calls the ‘identity’ of logic and metaphysics in the Science of Logic unless we see how Hegel does provide a kind of Deduction argument in the Logic, albeit one stripped of the psychologism present in the Kantian version. Accordingly, I provide a sketch of what such an ‘absolute’ Deduction must look like, and argue that Hegel's presentation of the ‘absolute idea’ functions as the conclusion of such an argument.

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Section: Notesmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…2 In what follows, both 'Science of Logic' and 'Logic' refer to Hegel's text; where I use the phrase 'the science of logic', I refer to the philosophical science that Hegel aims to accomplish in that text. 3 See Horstmann (2019), Kreines (2018) and Gabriel (2018). 4 Pippin calls this 'the basic identity at the heart of the Logic' (HRS: 252).…”

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confidence: 99%

Is there a Deduction in Hegel's Science of Logic?

Cooper-Simpson¹

2021

Hegel Bulletin

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“…3 Koch and Kreis give metaphysical readings that differ significantly, in particular, from Stern's and Kreines's understanding of metaphysics. See also Gabriel (2011), where I try to reconcile the ontological dimension of the various post-Kantian projects with Pippin's Kantian insistence that post-Kantian idealism is incompatible with a relapse into first-order metaphysics of the kind recently ascribed to Hegel by Kreines. 4 Kreines ascribes 'metaphysical "idealism"' to Hegel (2015: 232).…”

Section: Markus Gabrielmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…Yet the intelligibility of what there is is not grounded in the subject nor should we expect to find it 'out there'. 21 On this see Gabriel (2011). 22 This is Stanley Cavell's metaphor, designed to capture the picture of Cartesian-style scepticism.…”

Section: Markus Gabrielmentioning

confidence: 99%

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What Kind of an Idealist (If Any) Is Hegel?

Gabriel¹

2016

Hegel Bulletin

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In this paper, I first explore Hegel’s own distinctions between various types of idealism, most of which he explicitly rejects. I discuss his notions of subjective, transcendental and absolute idealism and present the outlines of his criticisms of the first two as well as the motivation behind his commitment to a version of absolute idealism. In particular, I argue that the latter does not share the defining features of what is now commonly called ‘idealism’, as Hegel neither denies the existence of an external world nor even holds that we can only somehow indirectly infer the truth of propositions about the external world from the structure of some given mental material. I give a basic account of what Hegel’s concept of ‘the absolute idea’ is about, which lies behind his absolute idealism. In this context, I maintain that it is crucial for our understanding of Hegel and of his potential relevance for contemporary metaphysics and epistemology that the absolute idea is precisely not a mental or ‘spiritual’ (geistig) entity. Rather, it amounts to a set of methodological assumptions designed to guarantee the overall intelligibility of what there is, regardless of its actual natural, social or more broadly normative structure.

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Robert Pippin’s Hegel as an Analytically Approachable Philosopher

Redding

2018

Australasian Philosophical Review

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Transcendental Ontology and Apperceptive Idealism

Cited by 5 publications

References 11 publications

Is there a Deduction in Hegel's Science of Logic?

Is there a Deduction in Hegel's Science of Logic?

What Kind of an Idealist (If Any) Is Hegel?

Robert Pippin’s Hegel as an Analytically Approachable Philosopher

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