Transcendental vs. comparative approaches to justice: a reappraisal of Sen's dichotomy

Ege, Ragıp; Igersheim, Herrade; Chapelain, Charlotte Le

doi:10.1080/09672567.2014.916734

Cited by 15 publications

(5 citation statements)

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“…Cette prise de position a provoqué un débat intense. Gamel (2010), Kandil (2010), Valentini (2011), Satz (2012, Freeman (2012), Robeyns (2012), Ege et al (2012), parmi d'autres, ont contesté l'opposition entre les deux types d'approche de la justice. Notre objectif n'est pas de revenir en détails sur ce débat.…”

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“…Nous pouvons certes admettre avec Sen que l'approche transcendantale n'est ni nécessaire ni suffisante pour établir un classement, mais il faut en contrepartie admettre que la robustesse de ce classement doit reposer sur une légitimité des critères utilisés, que ces critères soient raisonnables ; ce qui renvoie in fine à une approche transcendantale. Comme le soulignent Ege et al (2012), la notion « d'impartialité ouverte » que développe Sen, qui lui permet de fonder des comparaisons qui ne reposent pas sur des critères purement positionnels, renvoie à une interprétation du spectateur impartial d'Adam Smith fort présente chez Rawls. Valentini (2012) relève que Sen commet un excès en interprétant la théorie de la justice de Rawls comme un ensemble d'institutions idéales.…”

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Justice environnementale et approche par les capabilités

Ballet¹,

Bazin²,

Pelenc³

2015

Revue De Philosophie Économique

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Justice environnementale et approche par les capabilitésJérôme Ballet a) Damien Bazin b) , Jérôme Pelenc c)1 . Auteur de correspondance : Jérôme Ballet Résumé : Nous montrons que l'approche par les capabilités offre de sérieuses pistes pour donner tout son sens à la justice environnementale abordée sous l'angle de la justice comparative. L'approche des capabilités permet de prendre en compte les trois enjeux que soulève la justice environnementale : la distribution des bénéfices et des nuisances liés à l'environnement, les enjeux de participation des populations dans l'élaboration des régulations environnementales, la reconnaissance des identités collectives. Cependant, cela suppose d'une part de donner une priorité à la liberté de processus sur la liberté d'opportunités, d'autre part l'introduction du concept de capabilité collective.

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Justice environnementale et approche par les capabilités

Ballet¹,

Bazin²,

Pelenc³

2015

Revue De Philosophie Économique

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“…9.Some criticisms levelled at Rawls’s “institutionalist” position are instead questionable: for instance, those advanced by Sen (2009). For critical discussions of Sen’s criticisms, see Hinsch (2011), Freeman (2012), Valentini (2011), Moellendorf (2013), Gledhill (2014), Thomas (2014), Ege et al (2016). Similarly unconvincing are the well-known criticisms by Cohen (1997).…”

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What can urban policies and planning really learn from John Rawls? A multi-strata view of institutional action and a canvas conception of the just city

Moroni

2023

Planning Theory

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One of the most influential theories of justice in planning theory and practice has been, without doubt, that of John Rawls. The very idea of the just city is indebted to Rawls’s view. However, the way in which Rawlsian theory of justice has been imported into planning often seems debatable. This article aims to discuss this aspect critically. The objective is not merely to discuss certain planning approaches inspired by Rawls; it is also to investigate, in more general terms, what meaning and role (any theory of) justice could and should have for planning and urban policies. In revisiting John Rawls’s view, the article is structured around two points: first, a critical discussion on how Rawls’s theory of justice has been generally applied to urban policies and planning; second, an exploration of an alternative way to interpret and apply certain Rawlsian insights (often undervalued) in this field. The article is not intended to defend and recommend Rawls’s normative theory as a whole (i.e. in its entirety), but to evidence certain Rawlsian contributions of a general nature that are particularly important. Nor is it the aim of this article to contribute directly to the development of a specific substantive idea of the just city; instead, it is to highlight fundamental methodological and analytical caveats that are crucial in this regard. Rather than a “theory of the just city”, this article develops a “meta-theory of the just city”: that is, an approach specifying precautions and conditions for any coherent and convincing just city theory.

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“…The robustness of this dichotomy is increasingly debated among Sen's commentators(Ege, Igersheim and Le Chapelain 2012and 2016, Kandil 2010, Robeyns 2012). We will not here call into question whether Sen falls within a purely comparative approach, nor ask whether Smith's concept of the impartial spectator may be interpreted within this tradition.…”

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confidence: 99%

“…On the relationship between his work on social choice theory, capabilities and his approach to justice, seeGilardone (2015).7 Sen's reading of Rawls must be treated with care.Clare and Horn (2010: 78), for instance, show that Rawls is not guilty of all the accusations Sen levels at him Ege, Igersheim and Le Chapelain (2016). follow Sen in saying that the early Rawls belongs to the transcendental tradition, but criticize Sen's failure to take adequate note of Rawls's gradual shifts toward a more comparative analysis Gilardone (2015).…”

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A missing touch of Adam Smith in Amartya Sen’s account of public reasoning: the man within for the man without

Bréban

Gilardone

2020

Cambridge Journal of Economics

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Sen claims that his 2009 theory of justice is based in part upon Smith’s idea of the ‘impartial spectator’. His claim has received criticism: some authors have responded that his interpretation of Smith’s concept is unfaithful to the original; others, focussing on internal features of Sen’s analysis, critique his use of the Smithian impartial spectator, arguing that it is a weak point in his comparative theory of justice. In this paper, we address both sets of criticisms. While agreeing with commentators that Sen’s reading of Smith is somewhat unfaithful, we reiterate that his aim in The Idea of Justice is not to provide an exegesis of Smith but rather to build his own comparative theory of justice by ‘extending Adam Smith’s idea of the impartial spectator’ (IJ: 134) to his own project. After clarifying their distinct approaches to the concept of the impartial spectator, we draw upon our account of these differences to evaluate Sen’s own use of the concept. Despite significant divergences, we show that Sen’s version of the impartial spectator is not inconsistent with Smith’s analysis. Though it does not correspond to Smith’s concept, that is to what the Scottish philosopher sometimes calls the ‘man within’, it is reminiscent of another figure from Smith’s moral philosophy: the ‘man without’. Beyond this analogy, there are further connections between Smith’s imaginary figure of the ‘man within’ and Sen’s account of ‘common beliefs’—both notions are ways of representing our beliefs regarding what is moral or just. But whereas Smith’s moral philosophy offers an analysis of the process by which the ‘man without’ influences the ‘man within’, nothing of that kind is to be found in Sen’s conception of public reasoning. And it is here that Smith’s famous concept of ‘sympathy’ can supplement Sen’s theory, in a way that furnishes an answer to Shapiro’s (2011) criticism regarding the possibility of spontaneous change of beliefs towards greater impartiality.

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Transcendental vs. comparative approaches to justice: a reappraisal of Sen's dichotomy

Cited by 15 publications

References 18 publications

Justice environnementale et approche par les capabilités

Justice environnementale et approche par les capabilités

What can urban policies and planning really learn from John Rawls? A multi-strata view of institutional action and a canvas conception of the just city

A missing touch of Adam Smith in Amartya Sen’s account of public reasoning: the man within for the man without

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