Transfer of physical understanding in a non-tool-using parrot

Abstract

Physical cognition has generally been assessed in tool-using species that possess a relatively large brain size, such as corvids and apes. Parrots, like corvids and apes, also have large relative brain sizes, yet although parrots rarely use tools in the wild, growing evidence suggests comparable performances on physical cognition tasks. It is, however, unclear whether success on such tasks is facilitated by previous experience and training procedures. We therefore investigated physical comprehension of object relationships in two non-tool-using species of captive neotropical parrots on a new means-end paradigm, the Trap-Gaps task, using unfamiliar materials and modified training procedures that precluded procedural cues. Red-shouldered macaws (Diopsittaca nobilis) and black-headed caiques (Pionites melanocephala) were presented with an initial task that required them to discriminate between pulling food trays through gaps while attending to the respective width of the gaps and size of the trays. Subjects were then presented with a novel, but functionally equivalent, transfer task. Six of eight birds solved the initial task through trial-and-error learning. Four of these six birds solved the transfer task, with one caique demonstrating spontaneous comprehension. These findings suggest that non-tool-using parrots may possess capacities for sophisticated physical cognition by generalising previously learned rules across novel problems.

The elephant in the room: What matters cognitively in cumulative technological culture

“…3 These findings indicate that tool use and making – as well as construction behavior – might be based on distinct cognitive processes in nonhumans and humans. Even if nonhumans – including tool-users – may exhibit signs of causal understanding (Taylor et al 2009; van Horik & Emery 2016), they would not be able to understand unobservable causal properties. By contrast, humans can “reinterpret” the world in terms of unobservable, hypothetical entities such as causal forces (Penn & Povinelli 2007; Penn et al 2008b).…”

The evolution of general intelligence

“…Likewise, for advanced avian understanding of number concepts, see Smirnova (2013) and Ujfalussy et al (2014); these abilities are often at a level more advanced than those shown to date for nonhuman primates (e.g., Pepperberg 2006;Pepperberg & Carey 2012). Research papers on tool use by corvids that do not use tools in nature are too numerous to mention; for aspects of physical cognition in parrots, note van Horik and Emery (2016).…”

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“…She loves interdisciplinary and quantitative analyses of behavior and has worked on a wide variety of methods, including functional magnetic resonance imaging, multi-agent simulations, or eye-tracking. (Taylor et al 2009;van Horik & Emery 2016), they would not be able to understand unobservable causal properties. By contrast, humans can "reinterpret" the world in terms of unobservable, hypothetical entities such as causal forces (Penn & Povinelli 2007;Penn et al 2008b).…”