Transfer of Power and the Crisis of Dalit Politics in India, 1945–47

Abstract

Ever since its beginning, organized dalit politics under the leadership of Dr B. R. Ambedkar had been consistently moving away from the Indian National Congress and the Gandhian politics of integration. It was drifting towards an assertion of separate political identity of its own, which in the end was enshrined formally in the new constitution of the All India Scheduled Caste Federation, established in 1942. A textual discursive representation of this sense of alienation may be found in Ambedkar's book, What Congress and Gandhi Have Done to the Untouchables, published in 1945. Yet, within two years, in July 1947, we find Ambedkar accepting Congress nomination for a seat in the Constituent Assembly. A few months later he was inducted into the first Nehru Cabinet of free India, ostensibly on the basis of a recommendation from Gandhi himself. In January 1950, speaking at a general public meeting in Bombay, organized by the All India Scheduled Castes Federation, he advised the dalits to co-operate with the Congress and to think of their country first, before considering their sectarian interests. But then within a few months again, this alliance broke down over his differences with Congress stalwarts, who, among other things, refused to support him on the Hindu Code Bill. He resigned from the Cabinet in 1951 and in the subsequent general election in 1952, he was defeated in the Bombay parliamentary constituency by a political nonentity, whose only advantage was that he contested on a Congress ticket. Ambedkar's chief election agent, Kamalakant Chitre described this electoral debacle as nothing but a ‘crisis’.

Caste Politics and Partition in South Asian History

“…Instead, he placed much more emphasis on the fact that the Federation's misfortunes were explicable as a result of its own 'near total lack of organization' and a program that had little to offer to the masses. 21 His stance thus clearly contradicted Mendelsohn's and Vicziany's view that the 'root of Ambedkar's political failure was not of his own making'. 22 On the other hand, Christophe Jaffrelot largely concurred with Bandyopadhyay's assessment, and argued that the Federation's defeat was a reflection of its 'organisational weakness'.…”

“…23 Additionally, and in consonance with the rest of his work, Bandyopadhyay stressed that the Federation was contending against the 'popular appeal of nationalism and the euphoria of patriotism' which sought its finest hour in ousting British rule, as well as the Congress' multifarious attempts to enlist the Dalits to their cause. 24 He therefore explained the Federation's electoral failure as a result of its own inadequacies, and its inability to effectively counter the Congress' ideological appeal. This argument elicited the following response from Anupama Rao:…”

Aryans versus Non-Aryans: A Study of Dalit Narratives of India’s Ancient Past

“…For instance, the correspondence between the Secretary of State and the Viceroy of British India that happened on 8 February 1943, records: The fundamental weakness of the Scheduled Castes is that they are neither one thing nor the other … so long as they remain a part of the Hindu system, with no separate religion or basis of organisation as such, and continue to regard themselves as Hindus, it does look as if their only chance of betterment lay, not on the political side, but on gradually winning their way socially in the Hindu community. (quoted in Bandyopadhyay, 2000, p. 904, footnote 39)…”

The Question of Dalit Conversion in the 1930s

“…Ambedkar, who had vehemently criticized the Pact earlier, by 1946-47 had to reckon with the fact that the British government had forsaken the Dalits and the partition of India had discredited separate electorates. 47 These developments as well as his optimism about the future of a democracy based on adult franchise and his concern for the 'destiny of the country' led him to accept the new electoral system.…”