Transferring Morality to Human–Nonhuman Chimeras

Abstract

Human-nonhuman chimeras have been the focus of ethical controversies for more than a decade, yet some related issues remain unaddressed. For example, little has been said about the relationship between the origin of transferred cells and the morally relevant capacities to which they may give rise. Consider, for example, a developing mouse fetus that receives a brain stem cell transplant from a human and another that receives a brain stem cell transplant from a dolphin. If both chimeras acquire morally relevant capacities as a result of transplantation, and if those capacities are indistinguishable, should the difference in cell origin matter to how we classify these creatures? I argue that if morally relevant capacities are easy to detect, cell origin is irrelevant to how the chimera ought to be treated. However, if such capacities are hard to detect, cell origin should play a role in considerations about how to treat the chimera.

Newspaper coverage of human‐pig chimera research: A qualitative study on select media coverage of scientific breakthrough

“…These concerns are in line with the ethical literature regarding animal-human chimeras 2,7. For instance, Monika Piotrowska reflected on the relationship between the human origin of transferred cells and the morally relevant capacities that could emerge in a fully grown human-non-human chimera and the consequent moral classification of these creatures,8 an issue that was generally addressed in the articles.The benefits related to the development of the chimera research were more frequently mentioned than the risks or concerns. For instance, the long-term absolute benefit of the experiment, that is the possibility of using human-pig chimeras for human organ transplant, was always mentioned.…”

“…First of all, these experiments raise this critical point: Will these creatures develop human consciousness or other morally relevant psychological properties? If so, commentators are asking themselves what kind of ontological nature such creatures will have and, consequently, how they should be treated, especially in the research environment . Second, there is the issue of entering situations where functional human gametes may develop in the chimeric animals.…”

Human‐Animal Chimeras: The Moral Insignificance of Uniquely Human Capacities

“…The above kinds of research raise a common concern, which we can limn as follows: Humans are generally thought to have full moral status—or at least sufficient moral status that killing or inflicting serious harm on a human constitutes a serious moral wrong. The reason it is considered unethical to conduct invasive experiments on humans without their consent or to kill healthy humans to provide organs for others is usually thought to be connected to (one or more of) our cognitive capacities—for example, our rationality, empathy, and self‐awareness . If a chimeric animal's brain is partly composed of human cells, it could theoretically develop some or all of these capacities.…”

Academic Chimeras?

“…Piotrowska asks, "Should the distinct origins of the two mice, which may produce indistinguishable outcomes, force them into distinct moral classes?" (Piotrowska 2014). She answers "no" (for the most part).…”