Transfers in a polarized country: bridging the gap between efficiency and stability

Haimanko, Ori; Breton, Michel Le; Weber, Shlomo

doi:10.1016/j.jpubeco.2004.05.010

Cited by 75 publications

(52 citation statements)

References 24 publications

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“…primary elections are followed by general elections. Haimanko, LeBreton, and Weber [20] use similar assumptions to analyze equilibrium in a model where central governments use interregional redistribution to prevent succession of subgroups with divergent interests.…”

Section: Notes On Related Literaturementioning

confidence: 99%

Log-concave probability and its applications

Bagnoli

Bergstrom

Studies in Economic Theory

588

665

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In many applications, assumptions about the log-concavity of a probability distribution allow just enough special structure to yield a workable theory. This paper catalogs a series of theorems relating log-concavity and/or log-convexity of probability density functions, distribution functions, reliability functions, and their integrals. We list a large number of commonly-used probability distributions and report the log-concavity or log-convexity of their density functions and their integrals. We also discuss a variety of applications of log-concavity that have appeared in the literature.

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Section: Notes On Related Literaturementioning

confidence: 99%

Log-concave probability and its applications

Bagnoli

Bergstrom

Studies in Economic Theory

588

665

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“…More distantly related to this paper is the political economy literature on the size of nations; see Spolaore (2006) and the references therein for an exhaustive account. In particular, Le Breton and Weber (2003), and Haimanko et al (2005) use the framework of Alesina and Spolaore (1997) -in which groups of individuals can unilaterally withdraw from an existing state and create their own country -to study how interregional transfers can prevent secession. Nevertheless, citizens do not anticipate 2 The political science literature has also emphasized the role of incomplete information in civil wars (Fearon, 1995).…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Secessionism and minority protection in an uncertain world

Anesi

2012

Journal of Public Economics

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The focus for the Centre is research into individual and strategic decision-making using a combination of theoretical and experimental methods. On the theory side, members of the Centre investigate individual choice under uncertainty, cooperative and non-cooperative game theory, as well as theories of psychology, bounded rationality and evolutionary game theory. Members of the Centre have applied experimental methods in the fields of public economics, individual choice under risk and uncertainty, strategic interaction, and the performance of auctions, markets and other economic institutions. Much of the Centre's research involves collaborative projects with researchers from other departments in the UK and overseas. AbstractWith the changing economic circumstances confronting their countries, regionally concentrated minorities have been facing a strategic problem, important aspects of which can be stylized as a situation in which a minority leader is uncertain about the costs of secession for her community. This paper shows that this uncertainty is a central cause of secession, using a model which incorporates both policies to appease secessionist aspirations and informational asymmetries. In a situation of asymmetric information, in which the policy-maker is better informed about the consequences of separation than the minority leader, signaling incentives make secession the unique equilibrium outcome, whether mutually advantageous compromises exist or not. We also show that the ruling majority may seek to maintain political unity by pre-committing to minority protection rules which prevent bluffing by the informed policy-maker. Additionally, the model generates comparative statics results on the question of which states are most likely to adopt constitutional rules protecting the minorities living within their borders.

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“…3 Assuming uniformity is indeed a very special case and makes it di¢ cult for the reader to assess which results (such as the features of the equilibrium policy) may be generalized to other distributions. Also, assuming uniformity eliminates the possibility of discussing the impact of some societal characteristics like for instance polarization (Haimanko, Le Breton and Weber (2005)) or correlation between taste and income on the policy outcome.…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

On the (sequential) majority choice of public good size and location

2012

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This paper studies majority voting over the size and location of a public good when voters di¤er both in income and in their preferences for the public good location. Public good provision is …nanced either by a lump sum tax or by a proportional income tax. We analyze both the simultaneous and the sequential determinations of the public good's size and location. We show that, while the choice of the type of public good follows the traditional median logic, the majoritarian determination of the taxation rate need not coincide with the preferences of a median income citizen.With lump sum …nancing, income heterogeneity plays no role and the sequential equilibrium consists of the median location together with the public good level most-preferred by the individual located at the median distance from the median. This policy bundle also constitutes an equilibrium with simultaneous voting in the special case of a uniform bivariate distribution of individuals' income and location. With proportional taxation, there is no policy equilibrium with simultaneous voting. We o¤er a complete characterization of the equations describing the sequential equilibrium in the general case and we show why and how our results depart from those obtained with the lump sum case. The public good level is lower than the one emerging under lump sum taxation when the income distribution is concave and when the correlation between individuals'income and location is positive but not perfect.

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Transfers in a polarized country: bridging the gap between efficiency and stability

Cited by 75 publications

References 24 publications

Log-concave probability and its applications

Log-concave probability and its applications

Secessionism and minority protection in an uncertain world

On the (sequential) majority choice of public good size and location

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