Transformational Strategy or Gilded Pacification? Four Years On: The Niger Delta Armed Conflict and the DDR Process of the Nigerian Amnesty Programme

Abstract

My central aim in this paper is to evaluate the outcomes of the amnesty programme established in mid-2009 by the Nigerian government as a way of resolving the groundswell of violence in the oil-rich Niger Delta region. In particular, I focus analytic attention on the planning and implementation of the Disarmament, Demobilisation and Reintegration (DDR) process of the amnesty. I argue that while the amnesty promotes non-killing alternatives to conflict resolution and opens a door for stabilisation, its current planning and implementation is flawed and unable to reduce the long-term potential for armed conflict in the Niger Delta. Far from been a transformational strategy, I argue that the amnesty programme has become a strategy of gilded pacification essentially targeted at buying off militants and re-establishing oil and gas production in the Niger Delta without addressing the multilayered causes of peacelessness in the region.

Peacebuilding and transformational change in Nigeria's oil region

“…Underlying the Niger Delta DDR Program is the state's use of monetary incentives to negotiate peace with the insurgents and to create an environment conducive to oil production (Agbiboa, ; Ajayi & Adesote, ; Davidheiser & Nyiayaana, ; Eke, ; Obi, ; B. Okonofua, ; Schultze‐Kraft, ; Ushie, ). Because the state was under pressure to increase its oil output, it presented the peace program as “renegotiation of the prevailing political settlement geared at protecting the economic and political interests of powerful elites,” rather than a genuine peacebuilding intervention (Schultze‐Kraft, , p. 621).…”

“…Because the state was under pressure to increase its oil output, it presented the peace program as “renegotiation of the prevailing political settlement geared at protecting the economic and political interests of powerful elites,” rather than a genuine peacebuilding intervention (Schultze‐Kraft, , p. 621). The strategy of buying peace from insurgents, while successful in re‐establishing oil production, fails to address the root of the problem (Agbiboa, ; Aghedo, ; Davidheiser & Nyiayaana, ; Ushie, ). Such strategic undertakings are not limited to Nigeria only.…”

“…Although improvement in the relationship between the state and insurgents has led to changes in oil and gas production, the peacebuilding program has not been quite successful in addressing the root of insurgency in Nigeria's oil region (Agbiboa, ). As Muggah () noted, the termination of war does not necessarily guarantee the security and stability of postconflict societies.…”

“…Underlying the Niger Delta DDR Program is the state's use of monetary incentives to negotiate peace with the insurgents and to create an environment conducive to oil production (Agbiboa, 2015;Ajayi & Adesote, 2013;Davidheiser & Nyiayaana, 2011;Eke, 2015;Obi, 2014;B. Okonofua, 2016;Schultze-Kraft, 2017;Ushie, 2013).…”

“…Here, attention is drawn to the relational dimension of conflict transformation to explain the changes effected in or desired for the strengthening of relationships with emphasis on issues such as power, emotional interdependence, and communicative aspects of the conflict (Lederach, 2003). Although improvement in the relationship between the state and insurgents has led to changes in oil and gas production, the peacebuilding program has not been quite successful in addressing the root of insurgency in Nigeria's oil region (Agbiboa, 2015). As Muggah (2007) noted, the termination of war does not necessarily guarantee the security and stability of postconflict societies.…”