Transitioning Resolution Responsibility Between the Controller and Automation Team in Simulated NextGen Separation Assurance

2013 IEEE/AIAA 32nd Digital Avionics Systems Conference (DASC)

et al. 2013

In a study, that introduced ground-based separation assurance automation through a series of envisioned transitional phases of concept maturity, it was found that subjective responses to scales of workload, situation awareness, and acceptability in a post run questionnaire revealed as-predicted results for three of the four study conditions but not for the third, Moderate condition. The trend continued for losses of separation (LOS) where the number of LOS events were far greater than expected in the Moderate condition. To offer an account of why the Moderate condition was perceived to be more difficult to manage than predicted, researchers examined the increase in amount and complexity of traffic, increase in communication load, and increased complexities as a result of the simulation's mix of aircraft equipage. Further analysis compared the tools presented through the phases, finding that controllers took advantage of the informational properties of the tools presented but shied away from using their decision support capabilities. Taking into account similar findings from other studies, it is suggested that the Moderate condition represented the first step into a "shared control" environment, which requires the controller to use the automation as a decision making partner rather than just a provider of information. Viewed in this light, the combination of tools offered in the Moderate condition was reviewed and some tradeoffs that may offset the identified complexities were suggested.

Section: Figure 8 Number Of Detected Conflicts Across the Four Studymentioning

confidence: 99%

Investigating the complexity of transitioning separation assurance tools into nextgen air traffic control

Gomez

Martin

2013 IEEE/AIAA 32nd Digital Avionics Systems Conference (DASC)

et al. 2013

“…Results from [5] and [6] provide initial insights on the conflictresolution task, but do so from a limited scope: both focused specifically on the Moderate NextGen timeframe, as it exhibited several unique traits that warranted targeted investigations. The findings in [8] and [9] also hint at this subject, but only in the context of the Maximum NextGen time-frame: [8] was more concerned with the link between general automation usage and individual sector characteristics, while [9] was even more specific, looking at trends in the automation-inhibition actions. This paper continues the analysis of the SA5 data, exploring two areas.…”

Section: Methodsmentioning

confidence: 96%

“…Additionally, an investigation of the factors 5D2-4 contributing to workload across the four time-frames identified counts of conflicts, transitioning aircraft, and non-Data Comm-equipped aircraft, as wellcorrelated with the controllers' reported workload [7]. Another analyses examined how the controllers interacted with the automation, and how the traffic situations unique to each sector influenced those interactions [8], while yet another analyses focused just on the controllers' decisions to inhibit the automation [9].…”

Section: Previous Findingsmentioning

confidence: 99%

A closer look at automation behavior during a human-in-the-loop simulation

Mercer

Gomez

2014 IEEE/AIAA 33rd Digital Avionics Systems Conference (DASC)

et al. 2014

A 2012 Human-In-The-Loop air traffic control simulation investigated a gradual paradigm-shift in the allocation of functions between operators and automation. Air traffic controllers staffed five adjacent high-altitude en route sectors, and during the course of a two-week experiment, worked traffic under four different function allocation concepts aligned with increasingly mature NextGen operational environments. These NextGen 'timeframes' ranged from near current-day operations to nearly fully-automated control, in which the ground system's automation was responsible for detecting conflicts, issuing strategic and tactical resolutions, and alerting controllers to exceptional circumstances. This paper continues the investigations reported in previous publications. Analyses of data surrounding the conflict-resolution task serve as the context in which we investigate the interactions between controllers and the automation. The SA5 SimulationAlthough documented in [3-9], a brief description of the study's conditions follows. Baseline 'Current-Day' Time-FrameThe Baseline time-frame approximated a nearterm NextGen system, by adding only few differences to current-day, fielded operations. This time-frame assumed that all aircraft had Flight 5D2-2 Management System (FMS) capabilities and enhanced surveillance equipage to broadcast their position and state information.Roles and responsibilities in the Baseline time-frame were identical to those in today's operations, in which controllers were responsible for maintaining safe separation between aircraft, and did so with the available support of a flight-plan-aided conflict probe similar to the User Request Evaluation Tool (URET). Controllers issued all clearances via voice. Minimum NextGen Time-FrameThe second time-frame, referred to as 'Minimum NextGen', added to the Baseline time-frame a limited Data Comm implementation.The Minimum NextGen time-frame assumed 25% of the aircraft were Data Comm equipped, which enabled two primary changes in handling for those 'equipped' aircraft: the automation would automatically perform the hand-offs and transfers of communication for equipped aircraft, and all equipped aircraft had the clearance to follow their FMS-computed vertical profile, unless otherwise instructed by the controller. Decision-support tool enhancements were two-fold: the conflict probe's information was integrated directly in the data block, shown as minutes-to-go until the predicted Loss of Separation (LOS); and trial-planning functions were available to help the controller craft provisional trajectory changes. The trial-planning functions benefited from instantaneous what-if feedback regarding potential conflicts, also a result of conflict-probe integration. Despite the presence of trial-planning capabilities, controllers still issued all trajectory-related clearances via voice, as Data Comm was only available for transfer of communication messages.

“…The Maximum NextGen condition was the only opportunity to examine a feature of adaptable automation, as this was the only condition where the controller had the ability to inhibit the automated agent's actions upon aircraft. For information on the other conditions, the following publications discuss the experiment in detail: [3][4][5][6][7][8].…”

Section: Adaptable Automation For Maximum Nextgenmentioning

confidence: 99%

Controller inhibition of automated conflict resolutions in a maximum NextGen condition

Hunt

2014 IEEE/AIAA 33rd Digital Avionics Systems Conference (DASC)

Mercer

et al. 2014

With the continued projection of increases in air traffic density, operations in the National Airspace System (NAS) are expected to exceed human capabilities in the near future [1]. In order to address the bottleneck of human workload capacity, highly automated safety-critical systems are under development to support air traffic controllers. However, the transfer of tasks and capabilities from a human agent to an automated agent is not without its pitfalls. Human controllers provide safe, efficient, and creative problem-solving in conflict situationssituations that often are outside the abilities of an automated system. In order for controllers to best use their creative problem-solving skills in safety-critical situations, automated agents must shoulder 'routine' activities contributing to controller workload in the current-day system, such as housekeeping tasks and basic separation assurance activities.