Translating Modern Slavery into Management Practice

Abstract

This article examines how ill-defined legal norms around modern slavery are being outlined in supply chain legislation and then interpreted by management professionals. Building on an infrastructural analysis of supply chain governance, I uncover the set of practices that underlie recent regulations around modern slavery. I track the implementation of these laws by following the “chain of translation,” whereby information is transformed from on-the-ground raw data, to quantitative metrics of modern slavery risks, and, finally, to polished corporate statements. This analysis focuses on the critical role being played by the Supplier Ethical Data Exchange (Sedex), which is a platform for sharing responsible sourcing data. While Sedex is not an auditor and is not governed by lawyers, it is nonetheless serving an important function in interpreting legal norms around modern slavery and facilitating the implementation of supply chain laws. Yet there are potential costs to its expansive role. Sedex is translating modern slavery into a management problem largely based on quantitative metrics such as indicators and risk scorecards. While Sedex provides limited opportunities for public participation, it needs to be more transparent with respect to the methodology behind its metrics and provide further opportunities for comment by parties underrepresented in its governance.

Anti-trafficking Chains: Analyzing the Impact of Transparency Legislation in the UK Construction Sector

“…In tandem, the emphasis on reporting has created a fast-growing industry of legal services and professional guidance on compliance with the MSA. Nevertheless, consistently low compliance rates among eligible organizations and the poor quality of most corporate MSA statements have been noted (Field, Miller, and Butler-Sloss 2019;Sarfaty 2020;Carrier 2021). The resemblance of these findings to analyses of transparency legislation elsewhere (Chilton and Sarfaty 2017;Nolan 2018) serves as an indication of the limited effectiveness of this regulatory model in terms of corporate response and in reducing instances of trafficking (Re:Structure Lab 2021).…”

“…Section 54 of the MSA includes a requirement that businesses operating in the United Kingdom with an annual net turnover of at least thirty-six million British pounds publish a yearly slavery and human-trafficking statement, stating what measures the organization has taken to ensure that modern slavery is not occurring in their business or supply chains. Critical transparency legislation literature in the context of the MSA points to several of its main flaws, notably the minimal requirements for corporations to prove any actual advances; the lack of real incentives for corporations to take effective action (or responsibility) to tackle human trafficking; and the lack of any requirement for the establishment of enforcement mechanisms, which, together with the lack of sanctions, has resulted in low rates of compliance with the Act (Wen 2016;Simic and Blitz 2019;Le Baron 2020;Sarfaty 2020;Hsin et al 2021;Harris and Nolan 2022;Fudge, forthcoming). Within this burgeoning body of research analyzing the MSA's flaws, the intricacies of the responses to it, and the mechanisms that lead to low compliance rates and to its limited impact, few studies focus on the ways in which it is accepted, implemented, and operated on the ground by different actors (Sarfaty 2020;Monciardini, Bernaz and Andhov 2021;Islam and Van Staden 2022;Gutierrez-Huerter, Gold and Trautrims 2023).…”

“…Critical transparency legislation literature in the context of the MSA points to several of its main flaws, notably the minimal requirements for corporations to prove any actual advances; the lack of real incentives for corporations to take effective action (or responsibility) to tackle human trafficking; and the lack of any requirement for the establishment of enforcement mechanisms, which, together with the lack of sanctions, has resulted in low rates of compliance with the Act (Wen 2016;Simic and Blitz 2019;Le Baron 2020;Sarfaty 2020;Hsin et al 2021;Harris and Nolan 2022;Fudge, forthcoming). Within this burgeoning body of research analyzing the MSA's flaws, the intricacies of the responses to it, and the mechanisms that lead to low compliance rates and to its limited impact, few studies focus on the ways in which it is accepted, implemented, and operated on the ground by different actors (Sarfaty 2020;Monciardini, Bernaz and Andhov 2021;Islam and Van Staden 2022;Gutierrez-Huerter, Gold and Trautrims 2023). In this article, we seek to contribute to these studies and further theorize the understandings they offer by exploring power relations and institutional dynamics embedded in the process of implementing the MSA in the UK construction sector.…”

“…Accordingly, our analysis stems from understanding anti-trafficking initiatives as service providers within, rather than as external actors to, supply chains. Such an approach sheds light on the structural conditions within which anti-trafficking initiatives function as translators that model the law's requirements into corporate action via quantifiable measures (Sarfaty 2020), shape standards to legitimize corporate behavior (Fransen and LeBaron 2019), or exert discursive power as expert authorities (McVey 2022). The analysis presented in this article aims to illustrate that comprehending the limited impact of anti-trafficking chains requires an exploration of the nature of their interactions with supply chains and an examination of the structural conditions within which they operate.…”

Curtailing invisibility of health and safety risks

“…• Administrative processes hiding safety information e.g. improper work practice, health and safety problems related information (Sarfaty, 2020;Rasmussen et al, 2014;Turilli & Floridi, 2009).…”