Transmission Investments in a Multilateral Context

Buijs, Patrik; Belmans, Ronnie

doi:10.1109/tpwrs.2011.2162593

Cited by 26 publications

(8 citation statements)

References 20 publications

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“…The optimization problem faced by one zonal planner (Problem 5) is similar to the model presented by Buijs and Belmans (2011); since the lower-level is an equilibrium problem, each zonal planner faces an MPEC. Searching for Nash equilibria between several MPECs, we obtain an EPEC.…”

Section: The Nash Game Between Zonal Plannersmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…In contrast, Buijs and Belmans (2011) focus on network upgrades; they compare the supra-national welfare-optimal investment to two other approaches: first, a setup where the planner responsible for one zone decides on investment in the entire network seeking to maximize domestic welfare comprising consumer surplus, generator profits and congestion rents less investment costs. Similar to the work by Daxhelet and Smeers, the zonal planner takes into account the impact of her decisions on the spot market, which forms the lower level; it is agnostic with respect to the welfare effects in other zones.…”

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confidence: 99%

“…As already pointed out, this may not be adequate if a zonal planner can unilaterally improve domestic welfare, for instance by expanding a line which is entirely within her jurisdiction. Buijs and Belmans (2011) use genetic algorithms to solve each MPEC; it is not straightforward how this could be generalized to obtain a Nash equilibrium between the zonal planners. Two approaches to solve such EPEC-type problems are most commonly used in the literature: enumeration discretizes the strategy space for each strategic player; the lower-level optimization problem is then solved for each possible strategy of the upper-level game, and the pay-offs as well as deviation incentives for each player are determined ex-post.…”

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confidence: 99%

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National-Strategic Investment in European Power Transmission Capacity

Huppmann

Egerer

2014

SSRN Journal

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Standard-Nutzungsbedingungen:Die Dokumente auf EconStor dürfen zu eigenen wissenschaftlichen Zwecken und zum Privatgebrauch gespeichert und kopiert werden.Sie dürfen die Dokumente nicht für öffentliche oder kommerzielle Zwecke vervielfältigen, öffentlich ausstellen, öffentlich zugänglich machen, vertreiben oder anderweitig nutzen.Sofern die Verfasser die Dokumente unter Open-Content-Lizenzen (insbesondere CC-Lizenzen) zur Verfügung gestellt haben sollten, gelten abweichend von diesen Nutzungsbedingungen die in der dort genannten Lizenz gewährten Nutzungsrechte. Terms of use: Documents in May 7, 2014Abstract The transformation of the European energy system requires substantial investment in transmission capacity to facilitate cross-border trade and to efficiently integrate renewable energy sources. However, network planning in the EU is still mainly a national prerogative. In contrast to other studies aiming to identify the pan-European (continental) welfare-optimal transmission expansion, we investigate the impact of zonal planners deciding on network investment strategically, with the aim of maximizing the sum of consumer surplus, generator profits and congestion rents in their jurisdiction. This reflects the inadequacy of current mechanisms to compensate for welfare re-allocations across national boundaries arising from network upgrades.We propose a three-stage equilibrium model to describe the Nash game between zonal planners (i.e., national governments, regulators, or system operators), each taking into account the impact of network expansion on the electricity spot market and the resulting welfare effects on the constituents within her jurisdiction. Using a four-node sample network, we identify several Nash equilibria of the game between the zonal planners, and illustrate the failure to reach the first-best welfare expansion in the absence of an effective compensation mechanism.

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Section: The Nash Game Between Zonal Plannersmentioning

confidence: 99%

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confidence: 99%

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confidence: 99%

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National-Strategic Investment in European Power Transmission Capacity

Huppmann

Egerer

2014

SSRN Journal

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“…Therefore, we use the term collaborative for the proposed algorithm. The concept of cooperative and noncooperative solutions for TEP in the multilateral context is discussed in [13]. Papers that deal with the non-cooperative TEP consider, usually, the cooperative TEP's solution as benchmark results since it maximises the overall social welfare.…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Distributed optimisation‐based collaborative security‐constrained transmission expansion planning for multi‐regional systems

Mehrtash

Kargarian

Mohammadi

2019

IET Generation, Transmission & Distribution

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“…It does not evaluate the difference between the cooperative and non-cooperative approaches. Reference [9] compares these two approaches and concludes that they result to different optimum investment capacities but its variables are continuous which is not the case in transmission expansion planning formulation.…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Multi-national transmission planning using joint and disjoint solutions

Tohidi

Hesamzadeh

2013

2013 10th International Conference on the European Energy Market (EEM)

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Abstract-Transmission systems have a critical role in wellfunctioning of liberalised electricity markets. Diversity in generation portfolio and improving system reliability are the main incentives for significant cross-border trades between Transmission System Operators (TSOs) in Europe. Nowadays, two ways are discussed for investment in additional transmission capacity by multiple TSOs: (1) Cooperative approach and (2) non-cooperative approache. In cooperative planning, the governing body looks for the highest overall social welfare while in non-cooperative approach, each TSO decides on his own transmission system based on his social welfare. The problem is that the outcome of these two approaches might be different. Each TSO tries to maximise his own social welfare and they are reluctant to act in a joint solution where they are losing some of their social welfare. In the context, they prefer to act strategically in order to maximise their social welfare. This paper evaluates the joint and disjoint solutions of the multi-national transmission planning. We propose a simultaneous-move game between the involved TSOs. The game is formulated as a one-shot mixedinteger linear programming problem. Then the joint solution is developed by merging all TSOs in one TSO responsible for transmission planning in all TSOs' regions. The joint solution is formulated as a mixed-integer linear programming and used as the benchmark in our studies.

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Transmission Investments in a Multilateral Context

Cited by 26 publications

References 20 publications

National-Strategic Investment in European Power Transmission Capacity

National-Strategic Investment in European Power Transmission Capacity

Distributed optimisation‐based collaborative security‐constrained transmission expansion planning for multi‐regional systems

Multi-national transmission planning using joint and disjoint solutions

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