Transnational Representation in Global Labour Governance and the Politics of Input Legitimacy

Abstract

Private governance raises important questions about democratic representation. Rule making is rarely based on electoral authorisation by those in whose name rules are made—typically a requirement for democratic legitimacy. This requires revisiting the role of representation in input legitimacy in transnational governance, which remains underdeveloped. Focussing on private labour governance, we contrast two approaches to the transnational representation of worker interests in global supply chains: non-governmental organisations providing representative claims versus trade unions providing representative structures. Studying the Bangladesh Accord for Fire and Building Safety, we examine their interaction along three dimensions of democratic representation: 1) creating presence, 2) authorisation, and 3) accountability to affected constituents. We develop a framework that explains when representative claims and structures become complementary but also how the politics of input legitimacy shape whose interests get represented. We conclude by deriving theoretical and normative implications for transnational representation and input legitimacy in global governance.

After Rana Plaza: Governing Exploitative Workplace Labour Regimes in Bangladeshi Garment Export Factories

“…Large European lead firms, comprising 218 Accord members, shaped this institution together with two global unions federations (IndustriALL and UNIGlobal) and two global NGOs (the Clean Clothes Campaign and the Worker Rights Consortium). Guidance was provided by the ILO (Reinecke and Donaghey, 2021). Exclusion of the main factory employer organisation, the Bangladesh Garment Manufacturers and Exporters Association [BGMEA]-a trenchant critic of the Accord-was a continuing source of contention.…”

The Role of Deliberative Mini-Publics in Improving the Deliberative Capacity of Multi-Stakeholder Initiatives

“…This connects to the issue of representation of different stakeholders in MSIs, which generally takes the form of structural representation (Reinecke & Donaghey, 2021). This conception emphasizes the formal relationship between the represented and their representatives, focusing on how representatives are authorized and held accountable (Pitkin, 1967).…”

“…Through the use of random selection, stakeholders from the population that are not currently formally involved in the empowered space could now be included. In the same vein, this would solve some problems with representation through self-appointed third parties in MSIs (Reinecke & Donaghey, 2021) by representing stakeholders directly and in a descriptively representative manner. Once these stakeholders are included, this use would also foster a broader inclusion of discourses by stakeholders through balanced and comprehensive information.…”

“…Second, we contribute to our understanding of democratic representation in MSIs, a topic which to date has received minimal explicit attention (for an important exception, see Reinecke & Donaghey, 2021). MSIs tend to represent the many different stakeholders affected by their operations by following a form of structural representation in their governance structures (Reinecke & Donaghey, 2021), bundling similar interests (e.g., corporate, environmental, Global South) together in constituencies and authorizing representatives (i.e., through election or appointment) to represent these constituencies.…”

Understanding global union repertoires of action

“…There are good and obvious reasons for this focus since unions' ‘terrain of action is largely bounded by the contours of the nation state’ (Hyman, 2007, p. 194). There is also now a substantial body of work that examines international or transnational union campaigns, organizing initiatives, networks, and various forms of agreement‐making (see, e.g., Brookes, 2019; Donaghey & Reinecke, 2018; Fairbrother et al, 2013; Ford, 2019; Helfen & Fichter, 2013; Lévesque et al, 2018; Magdahl & Jordhus‐Lier, 2020; McCallum, 2013; Reinecke & Donaghey, 2022; Sarkar & Kuruvilla, 2020). Yet relatively few studies examine a broader spectrum of GUF activities.…”