Transnational Trafficking, Law Enforcement, and Victim Protection: A Middleman Trafficker’s Perspective

Abstract

Standard-Nutzungsbedingungen:Die Dokumente auf EconStor dürfen zu eigenen wissenschaftlichen Zwecken und zum Privatgebrauch gespeichert und kopiert werden.Sie dürfen die Dokumente nicht für öffentliche oder kommerzielle Zwecke vervielfältigen, öffentlich ausstellen, öffentlich zugänglich machen, vertreiben oder anderweitig nutzen.Sofern die Verfasser die Dokumente unter Open-Content-Lizenzen (insbesondere CC-Lizenzen) zur Verfügung gestellt haben sollten, gelten abweichend von diesen Nutzungsbedingungen die in der dort genannten Lizenz gewährten Nutzungsrechte. www.econstor.eu The Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA) in Bonn is a local and virtual international research center and a place of communication between science, politics and business. IZA is an independent nonprofit organization supported by Deutsche Post Foundation. The center is associated with the University of Bonn and offers a stimulating research environment through its international network, workshops and conferences, data service, project support, research visits and doctoral program. IZA engages in (i) original and internationally competitive research in all fields of labor economics, (ii) development of policy concepts, and (iii) dissemination of research results and concepts to the interested public. Terms of use: Documents in D I S C U S S I O N P A P E R S E R I E SIZA Discussion Papers often represent preliminary work and are circulated to encourage discussion. Citation of such a paper should account for its provisional character. A revised version may be available directly from the author. We explore three hitherto poorly understood characteristics of the human trafficking marketthe cross-border ease of mobility of traffickers, the relative bargaining strength of traffickers and final buyers, and the elasticity of buyers' demand. In a model of two-way bargaining, the exact configuration of these characteristics is shown to determine whether domestic and foreign crackdowns on illicit employment mutually reinforce or counteract one another in efforts to stem the tide of trafficking. Estimation results from a gravity model of trafficking present evidence consistent with the mutual reinforcement view, indicating considerable ease of mobility, partial bargaining power, and inelastic demand. JEL Classification:K42, R23, O15

Modeling for Determinants of Human Trafficking: An Empirical Analysis

“…Mahmoud and Trebesch (2010) suggest that having a migrant in a family tends to motivate other family members to migrate and also increases the probability of being trafficked. Akee, Basu, Chau and Khamis (2010) and Akee, Bedi, Basu and Chau (2014) also show that migration between two countries induces human trafficking flows between them.…”

“…These studies point out that such involvement of criminal organizations enlarges the scope of human trafficking operation, with profits made through such business amounting to billions of dollars every year (Belser, 2005). In quantitative empirical studies, Akee et al (2014) pioneered a study on traffickers' incentives to operate human trafficking business in different countries. Their study suggests that the level of law enforcement and corruption, as well as prostitution policy, can affect traffickers' incentives in selecting countries for their criminal operations.…”

“…Human trafficking researchers discuss law enforcement and the level of corruption as important factors, both in origin and destination countries (Akee et al 2010(Akee et al , 2014Cho, Dreher, & Neumayer, 2013;Jakobsson & Kotsadam, 2013). Besides the general rule of law, specific antitrafficking measures are also crucial to addressing the problem (Cho et al 2014;Cho & Vadlamannati, 2012;Potrafke, 2013).…”

“…Also, she is the author of the 3P Antitrafficking Policy Index measuring the institutional efforts of combating human trafficking. Akee et al (2010Akee et al ( , 2014Akee et al ( , 2012, Mahmoud and Trebesch (2010) negative/insignificant International Country Risk Guide Landlocked country (dummy) Akee et al (2010Akee et al ( , 2014Akee et al ( , 2012 Akee et al (2010Akee et al ( , 2012Akee et al ( , 2014 Landlocked country (dummy) Akee et al (2010Akee et al ( , 2012Akee et al ( , 2014 …”

Political determinants of efforts to protect victims of human trafficking

“…Previous research on the adaptation and enforcement of anti-trafficking policies has predominantly drawn on theories of international relations: states are conceptualized as unitary, coherent and rational actors whose decisions depend on the structure of the international system, irrespective of their internal, political composition [9,[11][12][13]. Hence, counter trafficking efforts are often seen as a product of what happens in the international system, rather than being brought about by processes within states themselves such as advocacy and political representation [14,15].…”