Transparency in the EU Council of Ministers: An Institutional Analysis

Abstract

The development of access to documents and open meetings provisions by the Council ofMinisters of the European Union shows an interesting pattern: before 1992 no formal transparency provisions existed, between 1992 and 2006 formal transparency provisions dramatically increased and since 2006 this increase has come to a halt. This paper aims to enhance our understanding of these shifts by conducting a historical institutional analysis of policy change. As explanatory factors, we consider the preferences and power resources of member states, as well as external catalysts and social structures. We conclude that the current revision deadlock is more stable than the situation before 1992, because now the protransparency coalition and transparency-sceptic Council majority have entrenched their positions. Nevertheless, and in spite of Council entrenchment, we expect that Council transparency will continue to develop in the longer term, under the pressure of increasingly influential outside actors, particularly the EP.

Transparency as a Platform for Institutional Politics: The Case of the Council of the European Union

“…While the transparency literature has explained the development of the policy public of access to Council documents with a considerable degree of detail (e.g. Bjurulf & Elgström, 2004;Hillebrandt et al, 2014), the role that this policy played in institutional politics, particularly that of the Parliament, has remained underexposed.…”

“…EU transparency has emerged as a distinct policy with a range of instruments, with public access to documents at its centre (Hillebrandt et al, 2014). An overarching legal framework makes each institution-including the Council and, by default, its formation of the FAC-1 responsible for the disclosure of documents that it holds.…”

“…The internal rules and their implementation soon cast member states against each other. Four member states (Denmark, Finland, the Netherlands and Sweden) frequently opposed what they considered to be a too narrow application of the transparency rules (Hillebrandt et al, 2014).…”

“…Curtin, 2013;Hillebrandt, Curtin, & Meijer, 2014;Maiani, Pasquier, & Villeneuve, 2011;Novak, 2013). Relatively limited attention has been devoted to the central role that instruments play for the creation of public access play in inter-institutional information politics.…”

‘Integration without transparency’? Reliance on the space to think in the European Council and Council

“…Even in the legislative area, and in spite of increased regulations on transparency, actors have persistently relied on the 'space to think' . The picture of transparency in legislative decision-making is a complex one because the transparency rules are implemented with varying success (Hillebrandt, Curtin, and Meijer 2014;. Indeed, the information publicly released during the plenary sessions of the Council might be partial or misleading because the Coreper deals with the bulk of the decisional process.…”