Traps of multi-level governance. Lessons from the implementation of the Water Framework Directive in Italy

Abstract

This contribution discusses the two main asymmetries of European Economic and Monetary Union (EMU) as they developed over the past two decades since the launch of the Single Currency. From the outset, EMU involved asymmetric degrees of integration in the area of 'economic' union (less centralised governance) versus 'monetary' union (more supranational governance). With the outbreak of the Sovereign Debt Crisis in 2010, the regime-shaping relevance of a second asymmetry emerged: one roughly between the member states of the Euro Area 'core' and those in the 'periphery'. Each of the two asymmetries have created a range of challengesinstitutional, policy and politicalthat undermine the stability and sustainability of the EMU project.

Unfolding the Water Framework Directive Implementation at the River Basin District Scale: An Italian Case Study on Irrigation Measures

“…The institutional system in Italy foresees that regional administrations can exercise significant administrative and regulatory functions within the legislative framework provided by the central government. In the field of water policy, the transfer of competences to the regions, however, occurred without clear coordination mechanisms between the two levels [10]. Moreover, when the increasing awareness on environmental problems brought to the first law establishing emission limit values (Law 319/1976), water protection and management were subject to separate regulations [11].…”

“…However, the regions went against the creation of river basin authorities and the related basin plans because they perceived these reforms to be an interference of the central government in their competences on water and soil management to the point that some regions brought an action against the Law 183/1989 to the Constitutional Court [13]. Despite the court rejecting their instances, these conflicts weakened the role of the river basin authorities, and the tensions between regions and state further increased [10].…”

“…This decree concerned both qualitative and quantitative aspects with the aim of achieving the 'good water status' of water resources, anticipating some basic concepts of the WFD. The decree introduced the regional water plans as part of the basin plans, with the aim to coordinate actions and measures for water protection across the river basins established by the Law 183/1989 [10]. Despite this purpose, the regional water plans were almost exclusively defined by the regions and the function of river basin authorities was limited to a final approval [13].…”

“…Within the Institutional Committee, the ministerial representation was larger than the regional representation, causing strong regional opposition [10].…”

“…Thus, it is not surprising that the implementation of the large-scale river basin approach required by the WFD was not smooth in Italy [10]. In particular, the RBDAs, although formally envisaged by the Environmental Code, did not acquire full competences until 2016.…”