Trends and Differentials in Moslem fertility

Abstract

This paper examines data on fertility levels in 33 Moslem countries between 1960 and 1980. Fertility measures include crude birth rate, total fertility rate and age-specific birth rate, and the percentage change in them between 1960 and 1980.The analysis focuses on: (1) the current status of Moslem fertility in comparison to non-Moslem countries in the same region; (2) the emerging fertility differentials among Moslem countries; (3) how much of the recent fertility declines in some Moslem countries is associated with modernization variables and with family planning efforts.The results indicate that: (1) Moslem fertility remains universally high and is generally higher than in non-Moslem countries in the same region;(2) very few Moslem countries have succeeded in bringing down their level of fertility to justify a search for the predictors of Moslem fertility levels; (3) in spite of a sufficient range of variations in the economic and social correlates of fertility, the corresponding fertility variables in these countries do not suggest that the reproductive behaviour of Moslem women has reacted to such variations; (4) efforts directed towards stronger family planning programmes are clearly related to fertility decline.

Demographic transition in Arab countries: A new perspective

“…2 Nagi (1984), in his attempt to link an overall social score (based on mortality, education, urbanization and income measures) with fertility decline for 27 Moslem countries, made the interesting observation that the few Moslem countries that have shown a definite fertility decline are not the ones that have the highest scores on the social setting index. In fact, these countries (Malaysia, Indonesia, Tunisia, Turkey and Egypt) fall into the categories of upper middle and lower middle social setting scores (Nagi 1984:194).…”

“…The incompatibility of fertility levels with socio-economic indicators has been advanced as the ultimate proof for a unique Arab model of fertility (Omran 1980;Nagi 1984). However, there is a need to better appreciate the context of this limited fertility change.…”

“…During the period between the 1950s and the 1980s, and as a result of an appreciable decline in mortality, the Arab growth rates became among the highest in the world (Mauldin 1980;Fargues 1989). The lack of fertility change despite the satisfaction of key conditions that moved fertility to lower plateaux in other countries is noted frequently (Omran 1980;Nagi 1984). Furthermore, statements linking Islam to the exceptionally high fertility and in some cases mortality and to the resistance to change are abundant (e.g.…”

Extremely high fertility of a sedentarized Bedouin clan in south Jordan: a genealogical-demographic approach to long-term change

“…In Arab societies with Muslim traditions, marriage is recognized as a basic function of reproductive success (Fargues, 1989), and females' early marriage, lack of freedom in the decision of marriage, low education level, and subordinate status in the family are considered to be closely related to the high fertility observed (Nagi, 1984;Obermeyer, 1992). More generally, early and universal marriage has been observed in most pre-modernized societies, leading to high fertility (Wood, 1994).…”