Trends in the Analysis of Interstate Rivalries

Thompson, William R.

doi:10.1002/9781118900772.etrds0369

Cited by 7 publications

(5 citation statements)

References 31 publications

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“…Even when the designated groups do not receive any assistance from foreign governments, a country still has low incentives to designate the same groups designated by its rivals for two reasons. First, rivals are competitive enemies that have a higher probability to clash, and historically have accounted for the majority of interstate violence (Thompson 2015). Due to this potential for armed clashes, a country has a desire to see its rival being weakened, as the rival's weakness will increase its own probability of victory in future conflicts.…”

Section: Determinants Of Terrorist Designationmentioning

confidence: 99%

The Determinants of Terrorist Listing

Lee

Tominaga

2023

Journal of Conflict Resolution

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Terrorist designation has increasingly become an important counterterrorism tool used by intergovernmental organizations and state governments. This article examines the determinants of terrorist listing and argues that terrorist listing is driven by security as well as political concerns. While countries tend to designate groups that pose a greater security threat, terrorist listing can also be influenced by interstate relationships including alliance ties and state rivalry. We test these arguments using a dataset on 35 countries that currently maintain their own lists of designated terrorist organizations. Our findings show that governments are more likely to list groups that have a record of attacking their domestic interests. Domestic groups are more likely to be designated than foreign groups. Moreover, countries are more likely to designate groups that are designated by their allies, even when these groups do not pose a direct threat. Our study contributes to the literature on terrorism and more broadly international security by systematically examining the determinants of terrorist designation and explaining the heterogeneity of terrorist lists across countries.

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Section: Determinants Of Terrorist Designationmentioning

confidence: 99%

The Determinants of Terrorist Listing

Lee

Tominaga

2023

Journal of Conflict Resolution

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“…Framers of the Greek Constitution of 1975 therefore sought strongly to enact provisions to ensure future governments would have the power necessary to prosecute future disputes with Turkey. I therefore include a measure for the presence of an interstate rivalry (Thompson and Dreyer, 2011).…”

Section: Emergency Power Originsmentioning

confidence: 99%

Emergency powers in democratic states: Introducing the Democratic Emergency Powers dataset

Rooney

2019

Research & Politics

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This article discusses the content and causes of emergency powers in democratic states. It makes two main contributions. First, it introduces the Democratic Emergency Powers dataset, which codifies formal rules of institutional change during periods of emergency for all democracies from 1800 to 2012. These data are important because often state institutions in times of emergency differ dramatically from those in times of relative peace, and this influences government decision-making during times of crisis. I discuss the collection process and develop a measure of the latent strength in each of these emergency provisions. Second, this article examines the determinants of emergency power strength in democratic nations cross nationally. I find that previous and current conflict experience influence emergency power provision and strength, but also that domestic determinants have an impact on the types of instruments states institutionalize for times of emergency.

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“…First, we measure of the number of MIDs a president was involved in prior to quarter t. Second, we control for the number of consecutive quarters immediately prior to quarter t in which the US was not involved in any militarized interstate disputes. Third, we control for the number of international rivalries in which the US is involved during a given year (Thompson and Dreyer, 2011). To account for unobserved factors that might affect conflict propensity or opportunity in specific historical periods and estimate the effect of ambition more precisely, in some models we include a set of dummy variables that take a value of 1 for each decade in the analysis.…”

Section: Control Variablesmentioning

confidence: 99%

Presidential political ambition and US foreign conflict behavior, 1816–2010

DiLorenzo

McBride

Ray

2016

Conflict Management and Peace Science

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How do term limits affect international conflict behavior? We revisit this question using new quarter-year-level data on presidential political ambition in the US from 1816 to 2010. Multi-country research finds that the re-election motive decreases the likelihood of conflict initiation. We argue that there are good reasons to expect that the US is different. We find that politically ambitious US presidents are more likely to initiate international conflicts. Consistent with previous research, however, we find that political ambition appears to be unrelated to a president’s chances of becoming the target of a militarized dispute.

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Trends in the Analysis of Interstate Rivalries

Cited by 7 publications

References 31 publications

The Determinants of Terrorist Listing

The Determinants of Terrorist Listing

Emergency powers in democratic states: Introducing the Democratic Emergency Powers dataset

Presidential political ambition and US foreign conflict behavior, 1816–2010

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