Tribal coalitions and lobbying outcomes: Evidence from administrative rulemaking

Abstract

American Indians are among the most underrepresented, yet heavily regulated, groups in national politics. While Indian nations maintain statuses as sovereign nations, they, and their people, remain affected by national policies addressing their treaty, land, resource, and civil and political rights. Theories of American Indian political incorporation suggest that Indian nations thus deploy interest group tactics to maintain or achieve favorable policy outcomes. We argue that coalition building, a ubiquitous lobbying strategy, enhances tribal policy advocacy and that “Native‐dominant” coalitions—those in which Native interests constitute a majority of members—are more influential than their non‐Native‐dominant counterparts. We test these claims using data from administrative rulemaking and find support for our hypotheses. We conclude that the unique particularities of tribal advocacy distinguish Native coalitions from those of other groups, and that their strategic lobbying choices may help to mediate representational disparities in policymaking by the executive branch.