Trickster Defeats the Revolution: Egypt as the Vanguard of the New Authoritarianism

Abstract

Egypt's January 25 Revolution often has been viewed as an explicit contest between the Hosni Mubarak regime and its cronies, who were able to prevail by pulling the levers of a "deep state," and revolutionaries espousing progressive visions, albeit visions divided between those of Islamists and non-Islamists, and often seen by each as mutually incompatible with the other. The defeat of the January 25 Revolution's progressive aspirations can be understood, to a substantial degree, as a victory by the old regime. However, revolution understood as a Liminal Crisis allows us to see the rise of 'Abd al-Fattah al-Sisi not as a straightforward restoration of the old regime, but as both a revolutionary outcome and as an instantiation of a New Authoritarianism that has been making significant strides toward power in the wake of the 2011 revolutions. Liminality is understood here as the intermediate stage in a transition as described in Victor Turner's Ritual Process and recently reinterpreted in the context of politics by Bjørn Thomassen. The potential dangers of liminality often are controlled by ritual, but this is not the case in revolutions, which become liminal crises precisely because there is no conventionalized means for closing off the state of being in-between. In such circumstances Tricksters-beings at home in liminality and often-elaborated in myth, folklore, and literature-become potentially dangerous in politics. Sisi can be seen as a Trickster politician. But more broadly, the structuring of liminality through the global political-economic order of contemporary capitalism both creates a generalized precarity outside the most elite levels of society, and at the same time predisposes those compelled to live in precarity to be attentive to political Tricksters. Hence liminality can be seen as both the beginning and the end of revolution .

Legitimation in post‐revolutionary Egypt: Al‐Sisi and the renewal of authoritarianism

“…The clear focus on institutional upgrading, the heart of the authoritarian regimes, was meant to explain the degree of change, continuity, and stability (Stacher, 2012, p. 24). Thus, the literature that has dealt with the adaptive capacities of the military regime and the re-entrenchment of authoritarianism under al-Sisi has focused on the institutionalization of new practices, for example, in the legal and legislative framework (Hamzawy, 2017); the role of the military (Aziz, 2017;Roll, 2016); the rise of Egypt's "securocratic state" (Abdelrahman, 2017); and the adjustments in the political system, including repression (Armbrust, 2017;Rutherford, 2018).…”

“…3 Although al-Sisi frequently emphasizes that his mission depends on the will of the people, the military electoral authoritarianism established under his rule lacks a connection to the constituencies that Mubarak had consolidated through the National Democratic Party. So far, al-Sisi has shown no interest in building a political party that will manage the patronage systems (Armbrust, 2017;Rutherford, 2018). This conscious strategy has led to the stifling of party politics (al-Shubaki, 2018;Hussein, 2019b) and may reflect his desire to avoid creating centers of power that would jeopardize the military's control and interests.…”

“…Many scholars and observers agree that the regime established under ʽAbd al‐Fattah al‐Sisi is not a straightforward restoration of the liberalizing autocratic regime that prevailed during the last decade of Hosni Mubarak's reign. Rather, it is viewed as an outcome of the 2011 revolution and a manifestation of what some have termed “a new authoritarianism” which is defined as the shift of control of the state to a new set of rulers and the establishment of a new political order (Armbrust, 2017; King, 2009; Rutherford, 2018). The use of the term “new authoritarianism” also refers to the evolution of authoritarianism under al‐Sisi and the strategies the regime is utilizing to maintain its hold on power in the face of internal and external circumstances created by the 2011 uprisings.…”

Repression, Cooptation, and Movement Fragmentation in Authoritarian Regimes: Evidence from the Youth Movement in Egypt

“…The increased repression manifested in various ways. For instance, there has been a growing number of civilian cases in military courts, a surge in jail sentences against activists, and the use of violence against demonstrators, often leading to hundreds of civilian deaths (Armbrust, 2017; Stacher, 2015). The repertoires of contention, specifically street demonstrations, graffiti, and public awareness campaigns developed into a political threat to the regime, which perceived them as having a large influence on public opinion.…”

“… 8. For a thorough description of all protest events during Morsi’s tenure in office, see: Walter Armbrust (2017) “Trickster Defeats the Revolution: Egypt as the Vanguard of the New Authoritarianism” Middle East Critique 26, no. 3: 221–239.…”