Triple Duel: The Impact of Coalition Fragmentation and Three-Corner Fights on the 2018 Malaysian Election

Abstract

Malaysia's previously hegemonic Barisan Nasional (BN) government was unexpectedly defeated in the 2018 general election despite a fragmented opposition and widespread three-corner fights that theory states should inhibit turnover. Why? We argue that the opposition-split hypothesis rests on three core assumptions: third parties split only the anti-incumbent vote; coalition/party support is relatively uniform across the country; and opposition parties are not “elite splits” in disguise. The Malaysian context challenges all three of these assumptions. Counterfactual election simulations ultimately suggest that the opposition split neither dramatically helped nor hurt the BN. While this does not upend conventional wisdom on opposition coordination, it does demonstrate that the theory manifests only when its assumptions accord with local realities. More substantively, our analysis also provides insights into why the new opposition will likely seek to increase the salience of ethno-religious issues in a bid to recapture electoral ground.

Opposing Power

“…The BN's co-optation of PAS to field candidates in a large number of electoral districts, thus forcing multiple three-cornered contests, failed spectacularly. Most anti-BN voters pooled their votes behind the PH candidates instead of splitting their loyalties between PH and PAS candidates (Ostwald, Schuler, and Chong 2019).…”

Pakatan Harapan's First Year in Putrajaya: Reform and Resistance

“…Communal politics that is deeply entrenched in the Malaysian political landscape makes it nearly impossible for any single political party to dominate the legislative branch on its own (Ostwald et al 2018). Instead, the prevailing multi-party system in Malaysia provides an incentive for inter-party and inter-cultural pacts between political elites from different parties to increase their chance of winning the elections.…”

Perception of survival and overconfidence: The case of Najib Razak (2009–2018)

“…Najib's 'loose coalition' with PAS resulted in a more Islamist BN which irked non-Muslim voters and pushed them back even farther. This 'rapprochement' between two erstwhile rivals was expected to prompt a three-cornered fight in GE14 to prevent Muslim Malay votes from swinging to the opposition (Ostwald et al, 2018). In 2016, Mahathir abandoned UMNO and initiated Parti Pribumi Bersatu Malaysia (Bersatu, or the United Bumiputera Party of Malaysia) along with some purged leaders critical of Najib's deep involvement in the 1MDB corruption scandal.…”

“…So that allowed a small party to gain control of the government. ( Malaysiakini , 2018)This comment displayed his acknowledgement that Malay votes were divided mainly between UMNO and PAS; ergo, the three-corner fight in GE14 he initiated was an unwise political move since it did not do much to fracture the opposition, and instead weakened BN (Ostwald et al, 2018). Another intriguing point that Najib mentioned was his decision to cooperate with PAS in the last election.…”