True Faith: Against Doxastic Partiality about Faith (in God and Religious Communities) and in Defence of Evidentialism

Epistemic phariseeism

“…These are not special experiences or religious commitments, but part of most people's total evidence, whatever their religious beliefs, that it makes sense to consider when reasoning about religious matters. I argue elsewhere that religious epistemology should place a high value on partialist as well as impartialist evidence (Dormandy 2018a; Idem 2021). The reason is that partialist evidence is apt to encapsulate genuine religious insight, but that it does so at the expense of fomenting biases that detract from truth; whereas impartialist evidence can hold partialist evidence accountable, but is less likely to resolve questions about religious reality one way or another.…”

“…This heavy weighting of partialist evidence in addressing counterarguments is part of how divine-help epistemology promotes epistemic phariseeism. It inclines believers to noetic entrenchment – an inability to appreciate other viewpoints or evidence against their own beliefs (for detail see Dormandy 2018a; Idem 2021). The reason is that this evidence, though an important potential source of religious insight, is also apt to reflect biases and groupthink.…”

“…The third sort of insight that non-believers can offer arises less from natural reason and more from experiences they may have had, themselves, of faith communities. To see this, note that many people are non-believers because of bad experiences in such communities, and so are uniquely positioned to shed light on ways in which people of faith may – pharisaically – stray from the ideals that they espouse (Dormandy 2018b; Idem 2021). For example, recent scandals come to mind in which abuses of power were revealed by community outsiders who used to belong to the community.…”

“…The corollary, however, is that non-believers will go even farther astray than they started. For relying predominantly on one's own experiences and background beliefs – religious or otherwise – is apt to cement biases or groupthink (Dormandy 2018 a ; Idem 2021). If your biases or groupthink push you towards inaccurate beliefs about religion, there will be little in the way of normative epistemology to encourage or nudge you back.…”

Faith: How to be Partial while Respecting the Evidence

“…For example, faith in a lover might require believing that they are trustworthy, faith in a political cause might demand believing it is just, and faith in God might oblige us to believe that God is good. Katherine Dormandy [2020] disagrees. She argues that partiality norms run afoul of noetic entrenchment, viz.…”