Trump’s Trade Policy, BREXIT, Corona Dynamics, EU Crisis and Declining Multilateralism

Abstract

Since 1991 there has been a reinforcement of the World Market Economy, not least since China and the, then new Russian Federation have joined the World Trade Organization and because of EU Eastern enlargement and ASEAN integration deepening, while the Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership (TTIP) and Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP) negotiations seemed to indicate stronger regional integration dynamics. With the Trump Administration, the situation has changed dramatically as President Trump is supportive of neither multilateralism in general nor of the EU, which is weakened through BREXIT, in particular. Trump's focus on the US merchandise trade balance deficit is ill-placed and import tariffs imposed on China seem to be excessive as the optimum tariff rate is miscalculated on the basis of the traditional formulawhile a new adequate formula would include the role of sectoral US outward FDI stocks. Asia, the EU and the US could define fighting the Corona World Recession as a global public good, but the United States is weakened in the corona pandemic crisis; the EU is facing serious problems in avoiding a Euro Crisis 2 problem and the €750 billion EU loan package could undermine the Eurozone's stability while being inadequate to minimize the risk of a Euro Crisis 2. At the same time, the prospects for EU cooperation are declining due to political disappointment concerning the national corona pandemic policy in some member countries. An effective anti-corona pandemic policy would mean to organize a consistent EU-ASEAN cooperation or a G20 cooperation with a later extension to UN Organizations, including the IMF, the World Bank and the WHO. Post-corona, global governance could change strongly because of the long-term political scarring effects of the pandemic shock which could undermine EU and Western stability. Networked international leadership in support of multilateralism is an innovativebut difficult-option for EU-ASEAN-Mercosur.

Advancing One Biosecurity to Address the Pandemic Risks of Biological Invasions

“…The traditional Westphalian model of governance driven by the interest of nation states is also changing in the face of the SARS-CoV-2 pandemic that has eroded governmental authority and emphasized an increasing role of nonstate actors (e.g., NGOs, private sector entities, philanthropic foundations, and academic institutions) and global organizations in decision-making (Mackenzie 2020 ). Even where the response to SARS-CoV-2 has led to increased nationalist or populist rhetoric (Welfens 2020 ), countries are beginning to view biosecurity not merely as a domestic concern but as a foreign policy issue foundational to national security (Horton 2020 ). Therefore, it would make sense that negotiations over binding agreements are not left to technocrats but involve political scientists who can better understand the complexity of interstate relations, the political economy of states, different socioeconomic conditions, and geopolitical differences in response (Davies and Wenham 2020 ).…”

Influence of liquidity and solvency on profitability of agroindustrial companies in the conditions of Covid-19

“…Strong public support and macro prudential policies have helped maintain stability in Covid 19 pandemic (Echarte Fernández, Náñez Alonso, Jorge-Vázquez, Reier Forradellas, 2021; Vapa Tankosić, Čavlin, Budjevac, 2020; Čavlin, Vapa Tankosić, Egić, 2021; Cipek & Ljutić, 2021). In the Eurozone there is a risk of increased commercial defence , and the risk of permanent adverse results on worlwide supply chains (Welfens, 2020). The countries most affected by the crisis are those that largely depend on tourism, traffic and other economic activities (Marjanović, Đukić, 2020).…”

International business policy in an age of political turbulence

“…This is where the populist leader enters the picture. The populist leader takes responsibility for decisionmaking and reassures the follower that someone else is indeed to blame (Hopkin, 2017, Inglehart andNorris, 2017;Welfens, 2020).…”