Trumping the Centers for Disease Control: A Case Comparison of the CDC’s Response to COVID-19, H1N1, and Ebola

Abstract

Despite being the richest and most prepared nation in the world, the U.S. responded badly to the COVID-19 crisis. This paper examines the nature of political control and the essence of bureaucratic failure for the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC), an independent agency. In three case studies, we analyze the CDC’s success in handling H1N1 and Ebola, and its failures on COVID-19. We find that the CDC suffered not only from political interference by the Trump Administration but also internal organizational problems that muted its ability to respond effectively. We conclude by offering policy prescriptions for addressing concerns of bureaucratic autonomy and success at the CDC.

Psychological well-being of young adults during COVID-19 pandemic: Lesson learned and future research agenda

“…This research study is the first systematic-cum-bibliometric study on the impact of COVID-19 on the psychological well-being of young adults unconventionally without adding any related health outbreaks like Ebola and H1N1 as considered in the various studies [ 67 ]. The results of this study widened the aspects of COVID-19 and psychological well-being to the researchers.…”

Slow data public health

“…Essential for efficient dissemination of information and to prevent wasting resources on trivial or biased information To prevent exaggerated information, excessive excitement, and eventual disappointment at the time of dissemination To enhance trust with proper and honest communication of uncertainty Improvements in peer review, reporting, and dissemination of research For surveillance, the processes of reporting and dissemination have to be explicitly defined a priori Mediatization of surveillance and study results can create sensationalism and should be done cautiously -to avoid "medicine by press release" Requires independent and scientifically credible institutions with experts trained in epidemiology and surveillance methods [24] Facebook, with about 250′000 responders per week, could estimate first-dose COVID-19 vaccine uptake in US adults with minuscule margins of errors but in excess of 17 percentage points compared to CDC estimates [19].…”

“…This calls to strengthen the autonomy and credibility of scientific institutions producing surveillance evidence, first, through adequate staff training in epidemiology and surveillance methods and, second, by maintaining a separation between these institutions and governments using this evidence to design policy. One must learn from the failure of the CDC on COVID-19, in part due to political interferences [24]. Highly credible scientific institutions are also necessary for experts from different domains to work together, despite different and evolving views on the evidence eroding trust in institutions, communities may eventually reject sound expert advice and evidence-based policymaking, as they become difficult to differentiate from the surrounding waste.…”

“…They also determine which resources are given to surveillance and research activity [ 6 ]. Surveillance experts, working in independent and scientifically credible institutions [ 24 ], are key players in linking policymakers and health data researchers. Once the needs are identified, these experts can design adequate surveillance systems.…”