“…A number of studies explore the consequences of new laws-like banking reforms (Hsieh & Wu, 2012), governance rules (Funchal & Monte-Mor, 2016), investor protection (Chen, Li, & Lin, 2015), and enhanced disclosures (Craighead, Magnan, & Thorne, 2004)-on the efficiency of regulations on shareholder litigation (Ni & Yin, 2018), takeovers (Cain, McKeon, & Solomon, 2017), and corporate governance (Aggarwal, Schloetzer, & Williamson, 2019). A main result of this literature is that new regulation is associated with significant abnormal returns, which do not necessarily increase corporate value (Larcker, Ormazabal, & Taylor, 2011) and whose effects are mitigated or amplified by country-or industry-level institutions (Giroud & Mueller, 2010 Moreover, trust operates as a substitute for formal shareholder protection, limiting self-dealing behavior and increasing corporate cash holdings (Dudley & Zhang, 2016) and financial development (Cline & Williamson, 2016).…”