2015
DOI: 10.2139/ssrn.2680280
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Trust and Corporate Cash Holdings

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Cited by 15 publications
(25 citation statements)
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“…Results show that culture affects dividend smoothing (Javakhadze, Ferris, & Sen, 2014), firm value, and performance (Fauver, McDonald, & Taboada, 2018). Moreover, trust operates as a substitute for formal shareholder protection, limiting self‐dealing behavior and increasing corporate cash holdings (Dudley & Zhang, 2016) and financial development (Cline & Williamson, 2016).…”
Section: Resultsmentioning
confidence: 99%
See 1 more Smart Citation
“…Results show that culture affects dividend smoothing (Javakhadze, Ferris, & Sen, 2014), firm value, and performance (Fauver, McDonald, & Taboada, 2018). Moreover, trust operates as a substitute for formal shareholder protection, limiting self‐dealing behavior and increasing corporate cash holdings (Dudley & Zhang, 2016) and financial development (Cline & Williamson, 2016).…”
Section: Resultsmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…A number of studies explore the consequences of new laws-like banking reforms (Hsieh & Wu, 2012), governance rules (Funchal & Monte-Mor, 2016), investor protection (Chen, Li, & Lin, 2015), and enhanced disclosures (Craighead, Magnan, & Thorne, 2004)-on the efficiency of regulations on shareholder litigation (Ni & Yin, 2018), takeovers (Cain, McKeon, & Solomon, 2017), and corporate governance (Aggarwal, Schloetzer, & Williamson, 2019). A main result of this literature is that new regulation is associated with significant abnormal returns, which do not necessarily increase corporate value (Larcker, Ormazabal, & Taylor, 2011) and whose effects are mitigated or amplified by country-or industry-level institutions (Giroud & Mueller, 2010 Moreover, trust operates as a substitute for formal shareholder protection, limiting self-dealing behavior and increasing corporate cash holdings (Dudley & Zhang, 2016) and financial development (Cline & Williamson, 2016).…”
Section: General Characteristics Of Previous Empirical Studiesmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…Agency incentives aim to discipline manager misbehavior regarding the efficient use of cash and to align managers and shareholders interests to enhance firm value (Anderson & Hamadi, ; Cheung, ; Dittmar et al, ; Dudley & Zhang, ; Louis, Sun, & Urcan, ; Nikolov & Whited, ; Deb et al, 2017). However, agency conflicts can have a relevant impact in cash holdings of corporations.…”
Section: Approaches Regarding Cash Holdings: a Brief Overviewmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…In addition, country‐level variables can also impact cash holdings due to agency problems. Dudley and Zhang () suggest that agency hypothesis predicts that shareholders will demand firms to disgorge more cash in countries with lower level of societal trust. Loncan () finds that mitigation of agency conflicts and reduction of financing constraints can be associate with the negative impact of foreign institutional ownership in cash holding, using a sample of firms in emerging economies.…”
Section: Approaches Regarding Cash Holdings: a Brief Overviewmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…In particular, these authors find that the negative correlation between cash holdings and cash-flow, and the positive association between cash holdings and debt maturity are an exclusive phenomenon of the U.K. and France, respectively. More recently, Dudley and Zhang (2016) emphasise that societal trust has a positive effect on firm cash holdings and this effect is stronger in firms located in countries with weak institutions. Moreover, they find that investors value cash more highly in firms located in countries with higher levels of societal trust.…”
Section: Related Literaturementioning
confidence: 99%