2016
DOI: 10.1016/j.jebo.2016.09.005
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Trust and in-group favoritism in a culture of crime

Abstract: Standard-Nutzungsbedingungen:Die Dokumente auf EconStor dürfen zu eigenen wissenschaftlichen Zwecken und zum Privatgebrauch gespeichert und kopiert werden.Sie dürfen die Dokumente nicht für öffentliche oder kommerzielle Zwecke vervielfältigen, öffentlich ausstellen, öffentlich zugänglich machen, vertreiben oder anderweitig nutzen.Sofern die Verfasser die Dokumente unter Open-Content-Lizenzen (insbesondere CC-Lizenzen) zur Verfügung gestellt haben sollten, gelten abweichend von diesen Nutzungsbedingungen die in… Show more

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Cited by 52 publications
(23 citation statements)
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“…For example, there is high trust within crime rings (Baccara & Bar-Isaac, 2008;Bowles & Gintis, 2004) and within communities that have been influenced by organized crime (Meier, Pierce, & Vaccaro, 2013). In these cases, there is high trust among ingroup members, but low trust in out-group members.…”
Section: Prosocial Lies and Trustmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…For example, there is high trust within crime rings (Baccara & Bar-Isaac, 2008;Bowles & Gintis, 2004) and within communities that have been influenced by organized crime (Meier, Pierce, & Vaccaro, 2013). In these cases, there is high trust among ingroup members, but low trust in out-group members.…”
Section: Prosocial Lies and Trustmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…However, research on corruption and favoritism provides evidence that individuals, at times, place enormous trust in others who have demonstrated low integrity. For example, there is high trust within crime rings (Baccara & Bar-Isaac, 2008;Bowles & Gintis, 2004) and within communities that have been influenced by organized crime (Meier, Pierce, & Vaccaro, 2013). In these cases, there is high trust among ingroup members, but low trust in out-group members.…”
Section: Prosocial Lies and Trustmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…Evidence for the economic implications of intergroup discrimination is vast and spans from discrimination in labor, housing, credit or consumer markets to political conflict or even social unrest (see, e.g., Arrow, 1998;Darity and Mason, 1998;Ladd, 1998;Yinger, 1998;Fershtman and Gneezy, 2000;Bernhard et al, 2006;Goette et al, 2006;Charness et al, 2007;Chen and Li, 2009;Meier et al, 2014). Discrimination entails potentially large efficiency costs by undermining the provision of public goods when interacting with out-group members (Habyarimana et al, 2007).…”
Section: Introductionmentioning
confidence: 99%