Trust and self-control: The moderating role of the default

Evans, Anthony M.; Dillon, Kyle D.; Goldin, Gideon; Krueger, Joachim I.

doi:10.1017/s1930297500002709

Cited by 39 publications

(13 citation statements)

References 38 publications

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“…Dual-process models of cognition offer just such a resource, providing a coherent foundation to organize extant theory and findings and move trust research forward. In an encouraging note, some authors have begun to rethink interpersonal trust from a dual process perspective (A. M. Evans, Dillon, Goldin, & Krueger, 2011;Murray et al, 2011). In this paper, we generalize this approach to include the entire gamut of entities upon which humans rely (inclusive.…”

Section: A Dual Process Model Of Reliancementioning

confidence: 99%

“…Because there are limits to deliberate cognition (Baumeister et al, 1998;Glenberg, 1996) deliberate trust must also be limited (A. M. Evans et al, 2011;Murray et al, 2011). For one, the possibility of being aware of one's vulnerability requires pertinent information, which may not be available, or if available may be faulty or incomplete.…”

Section: The Limits Of Deliberate Trustmentioning

confidence: 99%

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Deliberate Trust and Intuitive Faith: A Dual-Process Model of Reliance

Stoltz¹,

Ližardo²

2023

Preprint

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Drawing on the dual process framework from social and cognitive psychology, this paper reconciles two distinct conceptualizations of trust prevalent in the literature: “rational” calculative and irrational “affective” or normative. After critically reviewing previous attempts at reconciliation between these distinctions, we argue that the notion of trust as “reliance” is the higher order category of which “deliberate trust” and “intuitive faith” are subtypes. Our revised approach problematizes the conflation of epistemic uncertainty with phenomenological uncertainty while providing sound footing for a key sociological insight: that reliance on the routine social order is both the cognitive default and based on substantial practical evidence. We develop two broad suggestions for future research from these implications: (1) sociological research should examine the role of intuitive faith—as opposed to deliberate trust—in late modern societies, and (2) analysts should challenge the role of deliberate trust as the “modal” form of reliance in contemporary research.

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Section: A Dual Process Model Of Reliancementioning

confidence: 99%

Section: The Limits Of Deliberate Trustmentioning

confidence: 99%

Deliberate Trust and Intuitive Faith: A Dual-Process Model of Reliance

Stoltz¹,

Ližardo²

2023

Preprint

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“…On the trust game, see the seminal contributions by Kreps (1990) and Berg et al (1995). Also, Anderhub et al (2002); Engle-Warnick and Slonim (2004); Cox et al (2016); Evans et al (2011); Evans and Krueger (2014). For a meta-analysis of findings, see Johnson & Mislin (2011) and Holt (2019, pp.…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Pledging one’s trustworthiness through gifts: An experiment

Danese¹,

Mittone²

2022

Judgm. decis. mak.

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Ethnographers have recorded many instances of tokens donated as gifts to attract new partners or strengthen ties to existing ones. We study whether gifts are an effective pledge of the donor’s trustworthiness through an experiment modeled on the trust game. We vary whether the trustee can send a token before the trustor decides whether to transfer money; whether one of the tokens is rendered salient through experimental manipulations (a vote or an incentive-compatible rule of purchase for the tokens); and whether the subjects interact repeatedly or are randomly re-matched in each round. Tokens are frequently sent in all studies in which tokens are available, but repeated interaction, rather than gifts, is the leading behavioral driver in our data. In the studies with random pairs, trustors send significantly more points when the trustee has sent a token. Subjects in a fixed matching achieve comparable levels of trust and trustworthiness in the studies with and without tokens. The trustee’s decision to send a token is not predictive of the amount the trustee returns to the trustor. A token is used more sparingly whenever salient — a novel instance of endogenous value creation in the lab.

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“…Researchers tested the effectiveness of various modifications in the choice environments in several domains, such as transport (e.g., Gaker, Zheng, & Walker, 2010), financial decision making (e.g., Evans, Dillon, Goldin, & Krueger, 2011), public health (Li & Chapman, 2013;Darzi, 2016), andsustainability (e.g., Baca-Motes, Brown, Gneezy, Keenan, &Nelson, 2013). For example, in a research project on sustainable energy use, 40,000 German households were asked whether they would purchase their energy from renewable sources for a slightly higher price or not (Ebeling & Lotz, 2015).…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Investigating human decision-making: from processes to applications

Szászi

2018

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Individuals' propensity not to override the first answer that comes to mind is thought to be a crucial cause behind many failures in reasoning. In the present study, we aimed to explore the strategies used and the abilities employed when individuals solve the Cognitive Reflection Test (CRT), the most widely used measure of this tendency. Alongside individual differences measures, protocol analysis was employed to unfold the steps of the reasoning process in solving the CRT. This exploration revealed that there are several ways people solve or fail the test. Importantly, 77% of the cases in which reasoners gave the correct final answer in our protocol analysis, they started their response with the correct answer or with a line of thought which led to the correct answer. We also found that 39% of the incorrect responders reflected on their first response. The findings indicate that the suppression of the first answer may not be the only crucial feature of reflectivity in the CRT and that the lack of relevant knowledge is a prominent cause of the reasoning errors. Additionally, we confirmed that the CRT is a multifaceted construct: both numeracy and reflectivity account for performance. The results can help to better apprehend the "whys and whens" of the decision errors in heuristics and biases tasks and to further refine existing explanatory models.

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Trust and self-control: The moderating role of the default

Cited by 39 publications

References 38 publications

Deliberate Trust and Intuitive Faith: A Dual-Process Model of Reliance

Deliberate Trust and Intuitive Faith: A Dual-Process Model of Reliance

Pledging one’s trustworthiness through gifts: An experiment

Investigating human decision-making: from processes to applications

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