Trust between individuals and groups: Groups are less trusting than individuals but just as trustworthy

Kugler, Tamar; Bornstein, Gary; Kocher, Martin G.; Sutter, Matthias

doi:10.1016/j.joep.2006.12.003

Cited by 153 publications

(95 citation statements)

References 27 publications

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“…The Trust game 105 is another two-person game that shares some similarities with Kugler and her colleagues 107 showed that groups of three people sent on average lower amounts than individuals did. The Centipede game 110 is an extensive form of the trust game: two players repeatedly bargain over the allocation of an increasing pie.…”

Section: Trust Games and Other Sequential Gamesmentioning

confidence: 99%

Are groups more rational than individuals? A review of interactive decision making in groups

Kugler

Kausel

Kocher

2012

WIRES Cognitive Science

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146

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Many decisions are interactive; the outcome of one party depends not only on its decisions or on acts of nature but also on the decisions of others. In the present article, we review the literature on decision making made by groups of the past 25 years. Researchers have compared the strategic behavior of groups and individuals in many games: prisoner's dilemma, dictator, ultimatum, trust, centipede and principal-agent games, among others. Our review suggests that results are quite consistent in revealing that groups behave closer to the game-theoretical assumption of rationality and selfishness than individuals. We conclude by discussing future research avenues in this area. JEL-Code: C910, C920.

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Section: Trust Games and Other Sequential Gamesmentioning

confidence: 99%

Are groups more rational than individuals? A review of interactive decision making in groups

Kugler

Kausel

Kocher

2012

WIRES Cognitive Science

Self Cite

201

146

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“…Groups have been shown to behave less cooperatively in the ultimatum game (Bornstein & Yaniv 1998;Robert & Carnevale 1997) and the trust game (Song 2008;Kugler et al 2007), for example.…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Cartel formation and pricing: The effect of managerial decision-making rules

Gillet

Schram

Sonnemans

2011

International Journal of Industrial Organization

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We experimentally investigate how the managerial decision making process affects choices in a Bertrand pricing game with an opportunity to form non-binding cartels. To do so we compare the effects of three decision-making rules for the firm (decisions by CEOs, majority rule and consensus) to each other and to decisions in a benchmark consisting of single-individual firms. It has been argued elsewhere that groups behave more competitively than individuals. In this setting this predicts that for all three decision-making rules we should observe fewer cartels and lower prices. This is not what we find. For the formation of cartels, there are no differences across treatments. For prices asked, we find that first, cartels lead to higher prices in al treatments, despite the fact that they are non-binding. Second, the decision-making rules strongly affect the prices asked. One thing that stands out is that firms run by CEOs ask higher prices than observed in the other treatments.JEL Codes: C92; L40; L2

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“…The results of team decision making studies usually show that teams are closer to the standard game-theoretic predictions in the ultimatum game, thus choosing lower oers as proposers and accepting lower oers as responders (Bornstein and Yaniv, 1998), and send and return smaller amounts in an investment game (Cox, 2002 andKugler et al, 2007). Furthermore, teams exit a centipede game earlier than individuals (Bornstein et al, 2004) and show higher levels of rationality in beauty contests, thus outperforming individuals (Kocher and Sutter, 2005).…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 93%

Group Membership and Communication in Modified Dictator Games

Keldenich

2012

SSRN Journal

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Standard-Nutzungsbedingungen:Die Dokumente auf EconStor dürfen zu eigenen wissenschaftlichen Zwecken und zum Privatgebrauch gespeichert und kopiert werden.Sie dürfen die Dokumente nicht für öffentliche oder kommerzielle Zwecke vervielfältigen, öffentlich ausstellen, öffentlich zugänglich machen, vertreiben oder anderweitig nutzen.Sofern die Verfasser die Dokumente unter Open-Content-Lizenzen (insbesondere CC-Lizenzen) zur Verfügung gestellt haben sollten, gelten abweichend von diesen Nutzungsbedingungen die in der dort genannten Lizenz gewährten Nutzungsrechte. The working papers published in the Series constitute work in progress circulated to stimulate discussion and critical comments. Views expressed represent exclusively the authors' own opinions and do not necessarily refl ect those of the editors. Terms of use: Documents in Ruhr Economic Papers #322

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Trust between individuals and groups: Groups are less trusting than individuals but just as trustworthy

Cited by 153 publications

References 27 publications

Are groups more rational than individuals? A review of interactive decision making in groups

Are groups more rational than individuals? A review of interactive decision making in groups

Cartel formation and pricing: The effect of managerial decision-making rules

Group Membership and Communication in Modified Dictator Games

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