Trust games: A meta-analysis

Johnson, Noel D.; Mislin, Alexandra

doi:10.1016/j.joep.2011.05.007

Cited by 784 publications

(643 citation statements)

References 67 publications

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“…Despite the protests of philosophers and economists that it is irrational to do so, people trust strangers and those strangers reward that trust in study after study (for reviews, see Balliet & Van Lange, 2013a;Evans & Krueger, 2009;Johnson & Mislin, 2011;Wilson & Eckel, 2011).…”

mentioning

confidence: 99%

Trust at zero acquaintance: More a matter of respect than expectation of reward.

Dunning¹,

Anderson²,

Schlösser³

et al. 2014

Journal of Personality and Social Psychology

195

173

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Trust is essential for a secure and flourishing social life, but many economic and philosophical approaches argue that rational people should never extend it, in particular to strangers they will never encounter again. Emerging data on the trust game, a laboratory economic exchange, suggests that people trust strangers excessively (i.e., far more than their tolerance for risk and cynical views of their peers should allow). What produces this puzzling "excess" of trust? We argue that people trust due to a norm mandating that they show respect for the other person's character, presuming the other person has sufficient integrity and goodwill even if they do not believe it privately. Six studies provided converging evidence that decisions to trust follow the logic of norms. Trusting others is what people think they should do, and the emotions associated with fulfilling a social duty or responsibility (e.g., guilt, anxiety) account for at least a significant proportion of the excessive trust observed. Regarding the specific norm in play, trust rates collapse when respect for the other person's character is eliminated as an issue.

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mentioning

confidence: 99%

Trust at zero acquaintance: More a matter of respect than expectation of reward.

Dunning¹,

Anderson²,

Schlösser³

et al. 2014

Journal of Personality and Social Psychology

195

173

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

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“…Trust in this framework is measured by the amount of transfer as a proportion of their initial endowment, while trustworthiness is defined by the amount of transfer returned as a proportion of the amount available to return. An extensive review of the literature suggests several generalizable findings from the experiment (Johnson and Mislin 2011). First, players sent, on average, half of their initial endowment, and were returned a little more than onethirds of the other players' available funds.…”

Section: The Trust Broker Game: a Three-player Trust Game With Probabmentioning

confidence: 93%

“…(c) Further, would information asymmetries and reputational concerns jointly interact with the multiplier value to influence decisions? (Johnson & Mislin, 2011) Our key finding is that information availability significantly influences levels of trust and trustworthiness in the set-up of the Trust Broker Game. This is particularly the case for player C, who does not have any initial endowment.…”

mentioning

confidence: 85%

The Trust Broker Game: A Three-Player Trust Game with Probabilistic Returns and Information Asymmetry

Tagat

Kapoor²

2017

SSRN Journal

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Standard-Nutzungsbedingungen:Die Dokumente auf EconStor dürfen zu eigenen wissenschaftlichen Zwecken und zum Privatgebrauch gespeichert und kopiert werden.Sie dürfen die Dokumente nicht für öffentliche oder kommerzielle Zwecke vervielfältigen, öffentlich ausstellen, öffentlich zugänglich machen, vertreiben oder anderweitig nutzen.Sofern die Verfasser die Dokumente unter Open-Content-Lizenzen (insbesondere CC-Lizenzen) zur Verfügung gestellt haben sollten, gelten abweichend von diesen Nutzungsbedingungen die in der dort genannten Lizenz gewährten Nutzungsrechte. The trust broker game: a three-player trust game with probabilistic returns and information asymmetry Terms of use: Documents in Anirudh Tagat and Hansika KapoorAbstract This paper experimentally investigates trust and trustworthiness in a repeated and sequential three-player trust game with probabilistic returns and information asymmetry. It adds to the existing literature by combining experimental features from recent work in the trust game. The authors use random variations in the multiplier value, a third player without an initial endowment, undisclosed termination rules, and variations in information availability related to transactions. The framework is novel in that the game continues even if the first player transfers no amount to the second player. Using participants from India, the results are broadly consistent with past evidence on the trust game. All players are more trusting when information of their transfers and earnings are made available to other players. The third player (termed the "trust broker") transfers a larger amount when information on transfers is disclosed to other players. The authors find that information availability leads to a significant increase in the trust broker's reciprocity, as defined by the amount that is returned to Player 2. Social desirability, cultural contexts, and learning effects are discussed in terms of scope for future research. JEL C91 C92 D64 D70

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“…Need for closure and trust 13 Next, to assess participants' trust, we asked them to play an investment game (Berg, Dickhaut, & McCabe, 1995), a widely-used paradigm specifically designed and validated to measure behavioral trust (Johnson & Mislin, 2011). In this game, participants were asked to make a risky investment decision, in which the level of investment was determined by how much they trusted another person.…”

Section: Methodsmentioning

confidence: 99%

Trusting others: The polarization effect of need for closure.

Acar-Burkay¹,

Fennis²,

Warlop³

2014

Journal of Personality and Social Psychology

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Because trust-related issues inherently involve uncertainty, we expected individuals' socialcognitive motivation to manage uncertainty -which is captured by their need for closure -to influence their level of trust in others. Through the results of six studies, we showed that higher need for closure was related to more polarized trust judgments (i.e., low trust in distant others and high trust in close others) in the case of both chronic and situational need for closure. Moreover, participants with high need for closure did not revise their level of trust when they received feedback about the trustees' actual trustworthiness, whereas participants with low need for closure did. Overall, our findings indicate that polarized (either high or low, as opposed to moderate) and persistent levels of trust may serve people's seizing and freezing needs for achieving cognitive closure. Keywords: Need for closure, trust, uncertainty, interpersonal closenessNeed for closure and trust 3 Trusting others: The polarization effect of need for closure Trust is indispensable to all social relations. The presence of trust results in important benefits to both trustors and trustees at multiple levels (Kosfeld, Heinrichs, Zak, Fischbacher, & Fehr, 2005). For example, at the individual level, trust helps people to feel more secure (Erikson, 1950), to feel less unhappy or less maladjusted (Rotter, 1980), and to cope better with distress (Schill, Toves, & Ramanaiah, 1980). At the interpersonal level, trust enhances cooperation (McAllister, 1995) and information sharing (Butler, 1999). At the organizational level, trust reduces transaction costs (Barney & Hansen, 1994) and facilitates alliances (Uzzi, 1997). Finally, at the societal level, trust fosters solidarity (Misztal, 1996), prosperity (Fukuyama, 1995), and economic growth (Knack & Keefer, 1997;Zak & Knack, 2001).Consequently, many scholars (e.g., Arrow, 1974;Luhmann, 1979) conceptualize trust as a key lubricant of social life. However, although justified (i.e., non-violated) trust benefits all parties involved, trust also entails the risk of betrayal. Trust implies a situation in which one person (i.e., the trustor) chooses to rely on another (i.e. the trustee) without knowing what the exact consequences of doing so will be (Gambetta, 1988;Huang & Murnighan, 2010). Whether the trustee is a family member, a friend, or a business partner, it is always uncertain a priori whether one's trust in that person will prove to be justified. This fact raises the question of how individual differences in handling this uncertainty affect individuals' trust in others. In the present research, we argue and show that individuals' level of trust in others is a function of their cognitive-motivational differences in managing ambiguity and uncertainty. These differences are captured by individuals' varying levels of need for closure, which refers to a chronic or temporary tendency to avoid or to feel the need to resolve uncertainty and ambiguity . We further reason and demonstrate that the effe...

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Trust games: A meta-analysis

Cited by 784 publications

References 67 publications

Trust at zero acquaintance: More a matter of respect than expectation of reward.

Trust at zero acquaintance: More a matter of respect than expectation of reward.

The Trust Broker Game: A Three-Player Trust Game with Probabilistic Returns and Information Asymmetry

Trusting others: The polarization effect of need for closure.

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