Trust, reciprocity, and social history: A re-examination

The Pay-What-You-Want game: What can be learned from the experimental evidence on Dictator and Trust Games?

“…This implies that the other half of trustees returned more than the amount invested by the trustors ((1+r)T-Y>T). Similar results have been obtained in other TG experiments (see, e.g., the survey of Bolle, 1998;Ortmann, Fitzgerald and Boeing, 2000;Camerer, 2003, chap. 2.7).…”

“…Berg et al (1995, 132) argue that the salience of the internalized norm increases when subjects have already played the game. Results show that when social information is provided, trustworthiness increases (e.g., Berg et al, 1995;Ortmann, Fitzgerald and Boeing, 2000).…”

Inequality Aversion, Efficiency, and Maximin Preferences in Simple Distribution Experiments

“…In the trust or investment game (Berg et al, 1995, Ortmann et al, 2000 first movers who send money to second movers could be motivated by trust or by efficiency concerns, while due to the lack of efficiency gains, second movers returning money (which they do only to a limited extent in the experiments) cannot be attributed to efficiency concerns. In a similar experiment Van Huyck et al (1995) show that the investment increases with the achievable efficiency gains (so at least there is interaction with efficiency).…”

Decomposing trust and trustworthiness

“…This "social history" treatment was first used by Berg et al (1995) and then replicated by Ortmann, Fitzgerald and Boeing (2000) who found that even if trustors were graphically shown that trust typically "does not pay," their trust was not affected. Ortmann et al also elicited trustors' expectations of return.…”