Trust, Staking, and Expectations

Abstract

Trust is a kind of risky reliance on another person. Social scientists have offered two basic accounts of trust: predictive expectation accounts and staking (betting) accounts. Predictive expectation accounts identify trust with a judgment that performance is likely. Staking accounts identify trust with a judgment that reliance on the person's performance is worthwhile. I argue (1) that these two views of trust are different, (2) that the staking account is preferable to the predictive expectation account on grounds of intuitive adequacy and coherence with plausible explanations of action; and (3) that there are counterexamples to both accounts. I then set forward an additional necessary condition on trust (added to the staking view), according to which trust implies a moral expectation. When A trusts B to do x, A ascribes to B an obligation to do x, and holds B to this obligation. This Moral Expectation view throws new light on some of the consequences of misplaced trust. I use the example of physicians’ defensive behavior/defensive medicine to illustrate this final point.

Trust and distrust between patient and doctor

“…Nickel suggests that, knowing the cost of such ‘failure’, doctors may attempt to live up to patients' trust even when this is not medically appropriate. As he writes, ‘It is important to realize that misplaced trust can be bad, not because moral expectations are disappointed, but because they are met’ ([3], p. 359).…”

Can We Make Sense of the Notion of Trustworthy Technology?

“…The need for these stipulations shows that the pure rational-choice account does not make any principled distinction between trust and mere rational reliance. The account, therefore, is unfit to explain why performance-failure in cases of genuine trust leads to appropriate feelings of blame or betrayal in cases of malevolent breach of trust, and directed anger or disappointment in cases of negligence or incompetence (Nickel 2009). …”

“…Moralized notions of interpersonal trust, such as that in Nickel (2009), according to which trust implies a moral expectation that the object of trust will perform a certain way, also cannot be adapted straightforwardly to technology. In order to ascribe a moral obligation to some entity, one has to suppose that the entity is capable of responding to moral considerations and performing with responsibility and discretion.…”

Deliberate Trust and Intuitive Faith: A Dual‐Process Model of Reliance

“…The primary function of trust is therefore simplification of the world so a decision can be made. In contrast to “rational expectations” models of trust, Luhmann notes that trust requires the assumption of substantial risk or damage, otherwise actions would follow mechanically from a rational utility calculus (Nickel, ). By way of contrast, trust requires the assumption of personal responsibility to engage in the act, and is thus ineluctably connected to the modern notion of “risk.” This also means situations can change from one of confidence to one of trust if the element of choice, involvement, and responsibility changes.…”