Trust, trolleys and social dilemmas: A replication study.

Bostyn, Dries H.

doi:10.1037/xge0000295

Cited by 46 publications

(51 citation statements)

References 25 publications

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“…Casual observers may find it difficult to understand and accept the thought processes that underlie sacrificial decisions (e.g., trading lives for money in the present with the downstream goal of saving an even greater number of lives in the future). In general, people tend to dislike utilitarians, judging those that take sacrificial options more harshly than those who opt for adherence to inflexible moral rules (Bostyn & Roets, 2017;Everett et al, 2016;Uhlmann et al, 2013).…”

Section: The Search For Predictable Moral Partners: Predictability Anmentioning

confidence: 99%

The Search for Predictable Moral Partners: Predictability and Moral (Character) Preferences

Mh¹,

Ac²,

Ja³

et al. 2020

Preprint

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We propose that predictability is a key factor for judging the morality of others, one which has so far been neglected by dominant theories of moral psychology. Across four studies (N = 1,457 US residents and 81 traditional people of Papua), participants judged agents acting in sacrificial moral dilemmas. Utilitarian agents, described as opting to sacrifice a single individual for the greater good, were perceived as less predictable and less moral than deontological agents whose inaction resulted in five people being harmed. We show that these effects generalize to a non- Western sample of the Dani people, a traditional indigenous society of Papua. This moral preference for deontological agents was not due to a mere misunderstanding of utilitarian principles, as it persisted even when the underlying logic of utilitarian acts was explained. Furthermore, this preference reverses when the actions of utilitarian agents are made to seem more predictable, such as by presenting scenarios in which utilitarian acts involve an indirect (e.g., redirecting a trolley by flipping a switch) as opposed to direct (e.g., pushing a stranger onto trolley tracks) method of sacrifice. Despite the consequences of the sacrificial choice being identical for both direct and indirect acts, people perceived utilitarian agents to be less predictable, and consequently less moral when a direct sacrificial act was performed.

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Section: The Search For Predictable Moral Partners: Predictability Anmentioning

confidence: 99%

The Search for Predictable Moral Partners: Predictability and Moral (Character) Preferences

Mh¹,

Ac²,

Ja³

et al. 2020

Preprint

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

show abstract

“…For example, moral hypocrisy can be conceptualized as a disconnect between moral decision-making and moral judgment, where hypocrites judge others harshly for the same decisions they make themselves; in moral influence, inferences about the moral character of others shape one's own moral decisions; and work on person-centered morality demonstrates that inferences about moral character spill over into moral judgments of individual actions. Roets, 2017;Behrens, Hunt, Woolrich, & Rushworth, 2008;Diaconescu et al, 2014;Everett, Pizarro, & Crockett, 2016;Hackel, Doll, & Amodio, 2015;Giner-Sorolla & Chapman, 2017;Kliemann, Young, Scholz, & Saxe, 2008;Kleiman-Weiner, Saxe, & Tenenbaum, 2017;Knobe, 2010;Nadler, 2012).…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Modeling Morality in 3‐D: Decision‐Making, Judgment, and Inference

Siegel

Crockett

2018

Topics in Cognitive Science

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Humans face a fundamental challenge of how to balance selfish interests against moral considerations. Such trade‐offs are implicit in moral decisions about what to do; judgments of whether an action is morally right or wrong; and inferences about the moral character of others. To date, these three dimensions of moral cognition–decision‐making, judgment, and inference–have been studied largely independently, using very different experimental paradigms. However, important aspects of moral cognition occur at the intersection of multiple dimensions; for instance, moral hypocrisy can be conceived as a disconnect between moral decisions and moral judgments. Here we describe the advantages of investigating these three dimensions of moral cognition within a single computational framework. A core component of this framework is harm aversion, a moral sentiment defined as a distaste for harming others. The framework integrates economic utility models of harm aversion with Bayesian reinforcement learning models describing beliefs about others’ harm aversion. We show how this framework can provide novel insights into the mechanisms of moral decision‐making, judgment, and inference.

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“…(Bostyn & Roets, 2017;Everett, Pizarro & Crockett, 2016;Rom, Weiss & Conway, 2017;Sacco et al 2016). 21 The terminology "secondary dimensions" is more than just a metaphor.…”

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confidence: 99%

The dual-process approach to human sociality: Meta-analytic evidence for a theory of internalized heuristics for self-preservation

Capraro¹

2019

Preprint

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Which social decisions are intuitive? Which are deliberative? The dual-process approach to human sociality has emerged in the last decades as a vibrant and exciting area of research. Here, I review the existing literature on the cognitive basis of cooperation, altruism, honesty, positive and negative reciprocity, and (act) utilitarianism. I conclude by introducing a game-theoretical framework that organizes the majority of the empirical regularities. This framework extends Rand and colleagues’ Social Heuristics Hypothesis to any one-shot game G. The core assumption of this “General Social Heuristics Hypothesis” is that, under intuition, people play a Nash equilibrium of the “real analogue of G”, G^real, while under deliberation people play a Nash equilibrium of G. G^real differs from G along two dimensions: G is one-shot, while G^real might be iterated; the payoffs of G^real might be different from the payoffs of G, although they are ordered in (almost) the same way.

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Trust, trolleys and social dilemmas: A replication study.

Cited by 46 publications

References 25 publications

The Search for Predictable Moral Partners: Predictability and Moral (Character) Preferences

The Search for Predictable Moral Partners: Predictability and Moral (Character) Preferences

Modeling Morality in 3‐D: Decision‐Making, Judgment, and Inference

The dual-process approach to human sociality: Meta-analytic evidence for a theory of internalized heuristics for self-preservation

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