TrustTokenF: A Generic Security Framework for Mobile Two-Factor Authentication Using TrustZone

Zhang, Yingjun; Zhao, Shengmei; Qin, Yu; Yang, Bo; Feng, Dan

doi:10.1109/trustcom.2015.355

Cited by 10 publications

(5 citation statements)

References 12 publications

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“…Although we cannot do apples-to-apples comparisons, our TCB size is comparable to previous systems that have used OP-TEE for their implementation. For example, VButton [34] reports additional 1.3K, TrustTokenF [69] reports additional 4.5K, and TruZ-View [68] reports additional 3.4K.…”

Section: Tcb Sizementioning

confidence: 99%

Rushmore

Park

Kim

Sidhwani

et al. 2021

Proceedings of the 19th Annual International Conference on Mobile Systems, Applications, and Services

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We present Rushmore, a system that securely displays static or animated images using TrustZone. The core functionality of Rushmore is to securely decrypt and display encrypted images (sent by a trusted party) on a mobile device. Although previous approaches have shown that it is possible to securely display encrypted images using TrustZone, they exhibit a critical limitation that significantly hampers the applicability of using TrustZone for display security. The limitation is that, when the trusted domain of TrustZone (the secure world) takes control of the display, the untrusted domain (the normal world) cannot display anything simultaneously. This limitation comes from the fact that previous approaches give the secure world exclusive access to the display hardware to preserve security. With Rushmore, we overcome this limitation by leveraging a well-known, yet overlooked hardware feature called an IPU (Image Processing Unit) that provides multiple display channels. By partitioning these channels across the normal world and the secure world, we enable the two worlds to simultaneously display pixels on the screen without sacrificing security. Furthermore, we show that with the right type of cryptographic method, we can decrypt and display encrypted animated images at 30 FPS or higher for mediumto-small images and at around 30 FPS for large images. One notable cryptographic method we adapt for Rushmore is visual cryptography, and we demonstrate that it is a light-weight alternative to other cryptographic methods for certain use cases. Our evaluation shows that in addition to providing usable frame rates, Rushmore incurs less than 5% overhead to the applications running in the normal world. CCS CONCEPTS• Security and privacy → Mobile platform security; Trusted computing.

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Section: Tcb Sizementioning

confidence: 99%

Rushmore

Park

Kim

Sidhwani

et al. 2021

Proceedings of the 19th Annual International Conference on Mobile Systems, Applications, and Services

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“…To reduce app logic in TEE, many prior research efforts partition an app into secure and non-secure parts and only push the secure parts into the TEE [40], [60], [77]. This approach is hardly applicable to third-party apps because it still increases the TEE's attack surface and there can be many third-party apps.…”

Section: No App Logic In Teementioning

confidence: 99%

“…TrustShadow [29] runs an entire app in TrustZone's TEE, substantially increasing the latter's attack surface. Liu et al [43], AdAttester [40], TrustTokenF [77], and TLR [60] partition apps into sensitive and insensitive parts and only run the sensitive parts in the TEE, which still increases the latter's attack surface. Ginseng does not require any app logic in the TEE and provides a finer protection granularity, sensitive data, not all data in a sensitive function.…”

Section: Related Workmentioning

confidence: 99%

Ginseng: Keeping Secrets in Registers When You Distrust the Operating System

Yun

Lin

2019

Proceedings 2019 Network and Distributed System Security Symposium

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Many mobile and embedded apps possess sensitive data, or secrets. Trusting the operating system (OS), they often keep their secrets in the memory. Recent incidents have shown that the memory is not necessarily secure because the OS can be compromised due to inevitable vulnerabilities resulting from its sheer size and complexity. Existing solutions protect sensitive data against an untrusted OS by running app logic in the Secure world, a Trusted Execution Environment (TEE) supported by the ARM TrustZone technology. Because app logic increases the attack surface of their TEE, these solutions do not work for third-party apps. This work aims to support third-party apps without growing the attack surface, significant development effort, or performance overhead. Our solution, called Ginseng, protects sensitive data by allocating them to registers at compile time and encrypting them at runtime before they enter the memory, due to function calls, exceptions or lack of physical registers. Ginseng does not run any app logic in the TEE and only requires minor markups to support existing apps. We report a prototype implementation based on LLVM, ARM Trusted Firmware (ATF), and the HiKey board. We evaluate it with both microbenchmarks and real-world secret-holding apps. Our evaluation shows Ginseng efficiently protects sensitive data with low engineering effort. For example, a Ginsengenabled web server, Nginx, protects the TLS master key with no measurable overhead. We find Ginseng's overhead is proportional to how often sensitive data in registers have to be encrypted and decrypted, i.e., spilling and restoring sensitive data on a function call or under high register pressure. As a result, Ginseng is most suited to protecting small sensitive data, like a password or social security number.

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“…The most widely used smart cards in payment systems are mainly microprocessor chips. In addition, the Trustzone [24,25] is included in the microprocessor chip, which provides security features for smart wearable devices [26].…”

mentioning

confidence: 99%

LLAKEP: A Low-Latency Authentication and Key Exchange Protocol for Energy Internet of Things in the Metaverse Era

et al. 2022

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The authenticated key exchange (AKE) protocol can ensure secure communication between a client and a server in the electricity transaction of the Energy Internet of things (EIoT). Park proposed a two-factor authentication protocol 2PAKEP, whose computational burden of authentication is evenly shared by both sides. However, the computing capability of the client device is weaker than that of the server. Therefore, based on 2PAKEP, we propose an authentication protocol that transfers computational tasks from the client to the server. The client has fewer computing tasks in this protocol than the server, and the overall latency will be greatly reduced. Furthermore, the security of the proposed protocol is analyzed by using the ROR model and GNY logic. We verify the low-latency advantage of the proposed protocol through various comparative experiments and use it for EIoT electricity transaction systems in a Metaverse scenario.

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TrustTokenF: A Generic Security Framework for Mobile Two-Factor Authentication Using TrustZone

Cited by 10 publications

References 12 publications

Rushmore

Rushmore

Ginseng: Keeping Secrets in Registers When You Distrust the Operating System

LLAKEP: A Low-Latency Authentication and Key Exchange Protocol for Energy Internet of Things in the Metaverse Era

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