Truth and Politics

Arendt, Hannah

doi:10.1002/9780470776407.ch19

Cited by 136 publications

(128 citation statements)

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“…As Arendt (1967) argued, it is by telling stories that we can grasp the truth of events and thereby disclose practices which enlarge freedom. Here I tell a story of how I found myself that day in the Federal Court of Australia, and do so mindful of the fact that this approach enables some understandings and insights formed after the event.…”

Section: Events Leading To the Judgmentmentioning

confidence: 99%

Through a Glass Darkly: The Social Sciences Look at the Neoliberal University

Thornton¹

2015

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Section: Events Leading To the Judgmentmentioning

confidence: 99%

Through a Glass Darkly: The Social Sciences Look at the Neoliberal University

Thornton¹

2015

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“…The Arendtian idea of 'enlarged mentality' -of 'going visiting' -underlies the fact that political judgments are not merely idiosyncratic, but are validated intersubjectively. 8 The wider the scope of my enlarged mentality -the higher the number of individuals who are present and whose standpoint I try to occupy in making a decision -the greater the generality of my judgment. 9 And it is imagination that allows us to 'go visiting' and understand how a 7 problem looks from the perspective of the others -with whom we may, or may not agree.…”

Section: The Transformational Power Of Reflectionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Theorizing change: Between reflective judgment and the inertia of political Habitus

Mihai

2014

European Journal of Political Theory

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In an effort to delineate a more plausible account of political change, this paper reads Pierre Bourdieu's social theory as a corrective to exaggerated enthusiasm about the emancipatory force of reflection. This revised account valorizes both Bourdieu's insights into the acquired, embodied, durable nature of the political habitus and judgment theorists' trust in individuals' reflection as a perpetual force of novelty and spontaneity in the public sphere of democratic societies. The main purpose of this exercise is to reveal the mix of continuity and discontinuity that is characteristic of most transformations in the political common sense of democratic societies. In other words, this paper seeks to offer a more complex understanding of the inertial character of reflective judgment and of the difficulty of shifting the categories that define the political common sense. By cross-pollinating the ever-growing literature on reflective judgment and Bourdieu's sombre theory of politics, we can better calibrate our expectations regarding the possibilities of significant democratic transformation in late capitalist societies. * Earlier versions of this paper were presented at the Centre for the Study of Democracy, the University of Westminster, the Morrell Centre for Toleration, University of York and the Critical Theory Conference at the Czech Academy in Prague. I thank all participants, and especially my colleagues at York, for their insightful questions and recommendations. Thanks are also owed to the two anonymous reviewers for their extremely constructive criticism. Last but not least, Alessandro Ferrara, Mathias Thaler and Serdar Tekin generously read and provided useful suggestions.2

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“…Αυτό, βέβαια, δεν προκαθορίζει ότι η χρήση δεδομένων από πολιτικές οργανώσεις δεν θα μπορούσε να είναι νομιμοποιημένη [...]». 45 Στις ανωτέρω «πολιτικές οργανώσεις» δεν συμπεριλαμβάνονται οι φεμινιστικές εκείνες ομάδες, στις οποίες η Arendt ασκεί κριτική το 1932. Συγκεκριμένα, αναφε-ρόμενη στην πολιτική του αποτυχία, παραλληλίζει το «γυναικείο κίνημα» με αυτό της «νεότητας», στη βάση του κοινού αφαιρετικού τους χαρακτήρα.…”

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Το γυναικείο ζήτημα κατά τη Hannah Arendt

Καρούνια¹

2017

Conatus

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According to Hannah Arendt, into the earthly world of phenomenality, where reality depends on visibility and is identified with it, people appear in their “plurality”. Therefore, it is the concrete public personalities, speaking and acting in concert, that belong to the "arendtian world"— and not the purely private beings, or bodies as natural objects, or any empirical traits and indisputable facts, including sex. Based on these assumptions, Arendt apportions a character of abstraction to the claims of the feminist movement of her time. Respectively, it can be argued that the rationalistic feminist take-up of belonging to humanity converges, paradoxically, with the essentialistic view of the female sex, as follows: both tendencies seek to understand “what is” the woman. Arendt, however, is interested in the question of “who is” he or she who acts. Sex, just like every (biological) identity of the lonely self, is horizontally overridden by spontaneous initiatives and acting within the equalizing public sphere. Although politics is not based on empirical characteristics, these same facts filter out the citizens' unique perspective whenever their individual opinion is publicly expressed and, therefore, jointly perceived, and real.

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Truth and Politics

Cited by 136 publications

References 0 publications

Through a Glass Darkly: The Social Sciences Look at the Neoliberal University

Through a Glass Darkly: The Social Sciences Look at the Neoliberal University

Theorizing change: Between reflective judgment and the inertia of political Habitus

Το γυναικείο ζήτημα κατά τη Hannah Arendt

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