Truth, belief, and vagueness

Machina, Kenton

doi:10.1007/bf00263657

Cited by 140 publications

(39 citation statements)

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“…For example, after removing a few thousands hairs from the count's scalp, the statement (12) The count of Montecristo is still hairy 9 Fuzzy logic can be traced back to Zadeh's fuzzy set theory [1965]. Two representative applications to vagueness are Machina [1976] (on vague predicates) and Tye [1990] (on vague names).…”

Section: Ways Outmentioning

confidence: 99%

Vagueness, Logic and Ontology

Hyde¹

2016

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Section: Ways Outmentioning

confidence: 99%

Vagueness, Logic and Ontology

Hyde¹

2016

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“…A prominent variant of it, frequently to be found for instance in the literature on manyvalued semantics for vague languages (cf., e.g., [24]), considers the case in which a partial order is defined on the truth-values for which the greatest lower bounds (glb) exist, and set the ordered local entailment relation to be such that Γ |= § α iff glb( §(Γ )) §(α). The underlying intuition here is that of preservation of truth-degree from premises to conclusion; to put it in a slogan, one might say that "degrees of truth are not lost from premises to conclusion" or that "conclusions are no less true than their premises".…”

Section: Remarkmentioning

confidence: 99%

What is a Non-truth-functional Logic?

Marcos

2009

Stud Logica

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What is the fundamental insight behind truth-functionality? When is a logic interpretable by way of a truth-functional semantics? To address such questions in a satisfactory way, a formal definition of truthfunctionality from the point of view of abstract logics is clearly called for. As a matter of fact, such a definition has been available at least since the 70s, though to this day it still remains not very widely well-known.A clear distinction can be drawn between logics characterizable through: (1) genuinely finite-valued truth-tabular semantics; (2) no finite-valued but only an infinite-valued truth-tabular semantics; (3) no truth-tabular semantics at all. Any of those logics, however, can in principle be characterized through non-truth-functional valuation semantics, at least as soon as their associated consequence relations respect the usual tarskian postulates. So, paradoxical as that might seem at first, it turns out that truthfunctional logics may be adequately characterized by non-truth-functional semantics. Now, what feature of a given logic would guarantee it to dwell in class (1) or in class (2), irrespective of its circumstantial semantic characterization?The present contribution will recall and examine the basic definitions, presuppositions and results concerning truth-functionality of logics, and exhibit examples of logics indigenous to each of the aforementioned classes. Some problems pertaining to those definitions and to some of their conceivable generalizations will also be touched upon.

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“…36 Some will no doubt be disturbed by reflection on our habit of using vague terms in sentences in the complement clauses of attitude reports. Some might be encouraged to think that because we use sentences with vague predicates in the complement clauses of attitude sentences, we are committed to there being vague thought contents and vague concepts (see (Machina 1976), for example). The cost of thinking this is high.…”

Section: VIIImentioning

confidence: 99%